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The story of penal reform in the United States is an old and
discouraging one. From the development of the penitentiary in the
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, to the determinate
sentencing movement of the last two decades, penal "reforms" in
this country have led to few real improvements in the practice of
punishment. Even if the reforms alleviate past problems, in so do-
ing they create new ones, requiring further reforms which lead to
new abuses, and so on. Now that we are approaching the end of a
reform cycle, that centering on determinate sentencing, the time is
ripe for a general reconsideration of penal reform. Why do reforms
fail? Will anything work?
This Article seeks to answer these questions by developing a
general model of the reform process. Drawing from the examples
of three different reform movements-the creation of the peniten-
tiary in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries; the for-
mation of the modem correctional system in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries; and the determinate sentencing move-
ment of approximately the last fifteen years-the Article identifies
the three basic forces which shape penal change from suggestion
through implementation.
Reform begins with the proposal of a scheme for penal im-
provement. In most instances it is suggested by an idealist who links
the proposed penal reform to a view of the ideal society prominent
at the time. The idealist promotes a penal ideology' which empha-
* Associate Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; J.D., University of
Southern California, 1983; A.B., Harvard College, 1976. I would like to thank my col-
leagues Lawrence Solum and Donald Brosnan and my wife Linda Pillsbury for their sug-
gestions concerning this paper as well as the staffs of the Loyola Law Library and the
Huntington Library for their research assistance.
I Ideology here means a coherent set of ideas and values about an aspect of public
life. Thus, ideology is not used in the Marxist sense of a mythic (and usually false)
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sizes the rightness or goodness of the proposed change in terms of
society's relation to the criminal offender. Such reformers are pri-
marily concerned with justice in the broadest sense. 2 The moral
idealism which inspires them constitutes the first of the three major
forces which shape penal change.
The second major influence upon reform is what may be
termed society's need for order. Punishment serves not only the
needs ofjustice but also society's need to suppress crime and main-
tain civil order. The historical examples demonstrate that a pro-
gram of reform wins acceptance in part because the proposed
change promises more effective suppression of crime. The selling
of penal reform thus includes appeals to the values of stability and
civic peace; it also includes a sometimes explicit, sometimes implicit,
emotional appeal to retribution. The need for order inspires a de-
sire for harsher as well as more effective punishment. A new penal
method is more likely to win approval if it can satisfy the emotional
need of a criminally victimized people to strike back at criminals in
exemplary fashion.
In the early stages of the reform process, reform may seem to
satisfy both the need for order and the goals of moral idealism. The
new method or approach may credibly promise both a more moral
and a more effective means of punishment. In some instances, re-
formers simultaneously tout the justice and crime suppressant quali-
ties of reform. During the implementation process, when resources
are limited and political pressures for harsh punishment mount,
however, idealistic concerns prove less influential.
The interests of those employed in penal institutions comprise
the third and least recognized force affecting penal reform. Regard-
less of how punishment is conceived, its practice depends upon
human execution. Institutional players such as prison officials, pa-
role boards, judges, and prosecutors have their own professional in-
terests in shaping punishment. All are necessarily preoccupied with
the efficient operation of penal machinery. This goal of efficiency
may effectively override all other penal aims, especially in the con-
text of insufficient resources, a nearly endemic condition in Ameri-
can punishment.
Overall, the model of reform3 demonstrates that while particu-
conception of the world. Cf Introduction, From the Special Issue Editors, Special Issue:
Law and Ideology, 22 LAW & Soc'Y RE:v. 629, 630 (1988).
2 Thus, as we will see, the idealist view of punishment may be utilitarian or
deontological.
3 Use of the word model is not meant to suggest a structure accounting for all vari-
ables. The model presented accounts for only a few basic influences which are de-
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lar reforms are commonly associated with the idealists who first pro-
pose them, penal reform is better understood as change produced
by the confluence, compromise, and competition of the basic influ-
ences of moral idealism, need for order, and institutional interest.
The pluralist nature of the forces shaping penal change helps ex-
plain why reforms rarely produce their originally intended results.
Those who define the original goals play but one part in a compli-
cated process. This raises the question of whether any coherent
plan for penal improvement can succeed. It raises the possibility
that reform activity is actually counter-productive. For example, if
one is a moral idealist, one might conclude that, however it is origi-
nally defined, "reform" generally results in practices which serve
crime-suppressant and institutional interests more than those ofjus-
tice, and is thus a counterproductive endeavor.
This Article concludes that although the sort of ideological tri-
umph normally envisioned by reformers is probably impossible, re-
form remains a meaningful endeavor. The pluralist nature of
punishment suggests, however, the need for different reform strate-
gies and a different definition of successful reform. Since punish-
ment necessarily represents the compromise of the three major
influences, we should view successful reform not as the complete
victory of a single element, but the compromise between rival inter-
ests which will best accomplish our ideological goals over the life-
time of the institution or practice to be reformed.
By the standards of traditional criminal justice commentary, the
main thrust of the Article's analysis is non-normative: the Article
examines the gap between reform intentions and results, without
regard to whether the intentions are worthy. The Article deliber-
ately avoids analysis of the merits of different penal ideologies. In
another sense, however, the Article has a normative thrust because
it defends the basic endeavor of trying to improve penal practices
and institutions, even while demonstrating how difficult that is.
II. HISTORICAL EXAMPLES-THE CREATION OF THE PENITENTIARY,
1790-1830 AND THE CREATION OF THE CORRECTIONAL
SYSTEM, 1870-1920
Americans generally seem to prefer ahistorical approaches to
scribed at a level of great generality. The model should be taken as a beginning to an
understanding of reform, rather than an attempt to explicate completely. Similarly,
although the historical examples reviewed suggest a general chronologic pattern to re-
form, the Article leaves this pattern suggestive. For example, although idealist enthusi-
asm generally seems to precede reform's appeal to the need for order, this may not be
true in all instances.
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problem-solving. Our enthusiasm for new ideas discourages a thor-
ough examination of historical experience, which is itself discourag-
ing. This has certainly been true in most penal reform movements.
It is not that penal reformers are ignorant of the past; to the con-
trary, they generally present a vivid account of past practices-and
past evils-which the current reform will cure. This view of history,
however, is a narrow one, defined entirely by current reform con-
cems. The only questions asked about past experience are those
which the proposed change may answer.
This Article presents a broader view of penal change, one di-
vorced from the ideology of reform.4 The Article seeks to analyze
common patterns in the divergence between reform goals and the
penal practices which follow reform. The historical account pro-
vided is necessarily a broad-scale and sketchy view of past events,
more the statement of an historical hypothesis than a proof. The
Article does not seek to explain each reform movement in its full
complexity. Instead, it seeks to identify and understand the main,
recurrent influences upon penal change. I proceed in the belief that
present needs for a broad perspective on past penal reforms out-
weigh the obvious hazards of a schematic and suggestive approach
to history.5
A. THE CREATION OF THE PENITENTIARY, 1790-1830
In the history of American punishment, the most dramatic
change in penal methods came in the creation of the penitentiary in
the years following the American Revolution. Replacing the gal-
lows, whipping post, stocks, and pillory which had stood at the
center of American towns and villages throughout the colonial era
were massive structures, built in urban and rural areas, designed for
the collective incarceration and reform of a region's criminals. This
change, concentrated between 1790 and 1830, represented the first
major penal reform movement in America and was one of the more
4 By ideology of reform I mean the set of assumptions involved in the belief that
certain penal changes will necessarily improve the overall state of punishment.
5 The historical discussions rely almost entirely on secondary sources and, for that
reason, depend for their depth and coverage upon the extent of work already done in
the field. For the creation of the penitentiary, this presents relatively few problems as
the period generally and the process of penal reform in particular has been well-docu-
mented and analyzed. In contrast, the development of the correctional system in the
nineteenth century, with one important exception, has been largely neglected by mod-
em historians. See infra note 54. With regard to contemporary developments, recent
scholarship has illuminated some aspects of penal reform but many issues remain to be
explored. See infra note 159.
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important penal reforms of the Western world.6
The creation of the penitentiary also provides a clear example
of the basic dynamic of penal reform. The penitentiary was origi-
nally hailed as a symbol of progressive political and religious ideas.
Instead of tormenting wrongdoers, the pentitentiary would effect
their moral reformation. The penitentiary also filled a more basic
need. The new nation, founded upon ideals of a virtuous citizenry,
found that the old penal methods were inadequate to keep many of
its citizens virtuous. The penitentiary represented a new and more
effective means of suppressing crime. Perhaps the most important
influence upon the nature of the new punishment had nothing to do
with the goals of punishment, though-it was institutional. After a
period of disorder within the newjails and prisons, New York prison
wardens developed a system of harsh institutional discipline
designed to maintain order within the prison at the least cost to the
state. This system, adopted in most institutions across the nation,
ensured that the penitentiary was a place, not of benevolent rehabil-
itation, but of often brutal repression.
The creation of the penitentiary occurred in two phases. The
first phase, from approximately 1790 to 1815, witnessed both a leg-
islative shift from corporal punishment to incarceration as the pri-
mary criminal punishment and the opening of the first institutions
for penal incarceration. 7 During this period, reformers emphasized
the ideal of prisoner reformation. The second phase, from 1815 to
1830, saw the construction of mass penal institutions and the devel-
opment of a new disciplinary regime. Change during this period
6 Good modern accounts of the rise of the penitentiary may be found in the follow-
ing: M. IGNATIEFF, A JUST MEASURE OF PAIN: THE PENITENTIARY IN THE INDUSTRIAL
REVOLUTION, 1750-1850 (1978) (on the rise of the penitentiary in England); W. LEWIS,
FROM NEWGATE TO DANNEMORA: THE RISE OF THE PENITENTIARY IN NEW YORK, 1796-
1848 (1965); B. MCKELVEY, AMERICAN PRISONS: A HISTORY OF GOOD INTENTIONS
(1977); D. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM (1971). Earlier, but still useful,
works on the subject include the following: H.E. BARNES, THE REPRESSION OF CRIME
(1926) and THE STORY OF PUNISHMENT (1930); R. CALDWELL, THE PENITENTIARY MOVE-
MENT IN DELAWARE (1946); O.F. LEWIS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN PRISONS AND
PRISON CUSTOMS, 1776-1845 (1922) and N. TEETERS, THEY WERE IN PRISON: A HISTORY
OF THE PENNSYLVANIA PRISON SOCIETY (1937). Notable contemporary accounts from for-
eign visitors in the nineteenth century include the following: G. DE BEAUMONT & A. DE
TOCQUEVILLE, ON THE PENITENTIARY SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES AND ITS APPLICATION
IN FRANCE (1833); W. CRAWFORD, REPORT ON THE PENITENTIARIES OF THE UNITED STATES
(1835).
7 Americans had used carceral institutions before, but primarily as debtor's prisons
and to hold prisoners awaiting trial or the imposition of punishment. Occasionally, im-
prisonment was ordered as punishment for minor offenses. See H.E. BARNES, THE RE-




was characterized by a much tougher rhetoric, which emphasized re-
pression instead of reformation.
1. Moral Idealists
Of all American penal reform movements, that which followed
the American revolution was perhaps the most idealistic. The peni-
tentiary, which today stands as the symbol of so many, social ills, was
during the early years of the republic a symbol of the nation's great-
est hopes. The penitentiary was founded upon the ideals of republi-
canism and evangelical humanitarianism.
a. Republicanism
The movement to replace the traditional English corporal pun-
ishments in America was inspired by Enlightenment thought, in par-
ticular by that strand of philosophy known as republicanism.
Republicanism, as employed here, designates a particular public
policy ideology influential in a wide variety of social and political
debates in late eighteenth century America.8 Its rhetoric featured
dramatic dichotomies between the values of rationality, moderation,
and liberty associated with republics, and those of passion, excess,
and tyranny associated with monarchies. In the eyes of American
republicans, the assaultive corporal punishments of English law and
its excessive reliance upon capital punishment made it characteristic
of the monarchial ancien regime. Using the rhetoric of Montesquieu
and Beccaria, American reformers attacked the severity and irration-
ality of English penal law. 9 Corporal punishment lay at the heart of
the debate; an angry and cruel method of punishment in republican
eyes, it was decried as a physical representation of the monarch's
tyrannical oppression of his subjects10
8 There is a considerable literature on republicanism as an historical phenomenon.
Essential works include the following: B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967); J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT 506-52
(1975); G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1969). This
should be distinguished from recent legal scholarship drawing on republican ideas for
modern law. E.g., Symposium: The Republican Civic Tradition, 97 YALE L. J. 1493 (1988).
9 See BECCARIA, OF CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (D. Young trans. 1986); MoNTEs-
QUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAwS (1899). During the colonial era American penal prac-
tices were generally more moderate than those of England. Ironically, English criminal
justice served as the model ofjustice for eighteenth century continental observers, be-
cause English punishments were more moderate and procedure more progressive than
on the continent. For example, see Montesquieu's discussion of torture, comparing
continental and English practices. MONTESQ.UIEU, supra, at 91.
10 See the following from W. BRADFORD, AN INQUIRY ON How FAR THE PUNISHMENT
OF DEATH Is NECESSARY IN PENNSYLVANIA 5 (1793), quoted in 0. LEWIS, supra note 6, at
10:
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Incarceration presented a solution to these evils. Here was a
punishment which operated primarily upon the mind and not the
body of the offender, a punishment without violence. It was, by con-
trast with punishments such as branding and whipping before a
howling mob, a calm and moderate punishment, and one which
could be rationally apportioned to severity of crime according to
utilitarian principles of deterrence. The penitentiary provided a so-
lution to a basic moral challenge facing the new nation. Republics,
many believed, depended upon the virtue of their citizens. Criminal
activity raised questions about that virtue and about how a virtuous
citizenry would punish public offenses." The penitentiary, by its
emphasis on offender reformation, would cause the offender to real-
ize his virtuous potential and so provide an enlightened solution to
both dilemmas.12
b. Evangelical Humanitarianism
Religious belief also played an important role in the move from
the whipping post to the penitentiary. Early American penal re-
formers tended to be pious men, many of them Quakers, who had
rejected the determinist worldly gloom of Calvin for a vision of
Christianity which required heroic efforts to save their fellow man.
Their approach to penal reform was inspired by the life and exam-
ple ofJohn Howard, the English jail reformer of the late eighteenth
century.' 3 After being appointed Sheriff of Bedford, England in
"[O]n no subject has government, in different parts of the world, discovered more
indolence and inattention than in the construction or reform of the penal code....
Hence sanguinary punishments, contrived in despotic and barbarous ages, have
been continued when the progress of freedom, science and morals renders them
unnecessary and mischievous: and laws, the offspring of a corrupted monarchy, are
fostered in the bosom of a youthful republic."
See also B. RUSH, AN ENQUIRY INTO THE EFFECTS OF PUBLIC PUNISHMENTS UPON
CRIMINALS AND UPON SOCIETY (1787); M. GLENN, CAMPAIGNS AGAINST CORPORAL PUN-
ISHMENT 55-56 (1984).
11 See Masur, The Revision of the Criminal Law in Post-Revolutionary America, 8 CRIM.JUST.
HIST. 21, 28-29 (1987).
12 C. LoWNES, AN ACCOUNT OF THE ALTERATION AND PRESENT STATE OF THE PENAL
LAWS OF PENNSYLVANIA, ETC. (1792); B. RUSH, supra note 10; N. TEETERS, supra note 6, at
9-45. For a brief account of early criminal law reforms inspired by republican thought,
see L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAw 280-82 (2d ed. 1985).
13 See H. BARNES, THE REPRESSION OF CRIME, supra note 6, at 94; M. IGNATIEFF, supra
note 6, at 47-59. Although Quakers predominated in the reform movement in Penn-
sylvania, an Episcopalian bishop was the first president of the state's reform society and
many non-Quakers were also active in penal reform. See BARNES, Introduction to Teeters,
They Were in Prison, supra note 6, at x. Quakers were also influential in early New York
reform. See S. JAMES, A PEOPLE AMONG PEOPLES: QUAKER BENEVOLENCE IN EIGHTEENTH
CENTURY AMERICA 289-91 (1963). A second generation of religious reformers, exempli-
fied by Louis Dwight of the Boston Prison Society, espoused their own evangelical
Christian faith. See B. MCKELVEY, supra note 6, at 15; see also infra note 18.
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1773, Howard discovered the appalling condition of English jails
and took up a personal crusade of institutional inspection, report-
ing, and reform agitation. His detailed, scientific accounts of tours
of the jails of England and continental Europe combined with his
reform recommendations 14 laid much of the political groundwork
for the penitentiary movement in both England and America.
Like Howard, many of the early American reformers saw penal
reform as part of their Christian duty to fellow man. The constitu-
tion of the first post-Revolution American penal reform group, the
Philadelphia Society for Alleviating the Miseries of Public Prisons,
provided: "When we consider that the obligations of benevolence,
which are founded on the precepts and example of the author of
Christianity, are not cancelled by the follies or crimes of our fellow-
creatures . . ." and considering the suffering of prisoners, "it be-
comes us to extend our compassion to that part of mankind, who are
the subjects of these miseries."1 5 The object of criminal punish-
ment must be reformation of the offender "'without indulging in
vindictive feelings.' "16 Offenders were viewed as unhappy, unfortu-
nate creatures in need of moral guidance. They were people.
17
The only form of punishment which could reflect these moral
truths was incarceration, usually with an emphasis upon solitary
confinement. Although the jails and prisons of the late eighteenth
century past were horrific, humanitarian reformers envisioned in-
carceral places of cleanliness, health, and penance-tough monas-
teries for wayward souls. Here was a punishment which could be
benevolent, which could save the sinner instead of damn him.' 8
14 SeeJ. HOWARD, THE STATE OF THE PRISONS (1929).
15 Constitution of the Philadelphia Society for Alleviating the Miseries of Public Pris-
ons (May 8, 1787).
16 R. CALDWELL, supra note 6, at 218 (quoting REPORT OF DELAWARE HOUSE COMMIT-
TEE ON PENAL REFORM (Jan. 1818)).
17 E.g., "Some seem to forget that the prisoner is a rational being, of like feelings and
passions with themselves," C. LOWNES, supra note 12, at 10. Dr. Benjamin Rush, another
Quaker Philadelphia reformer, wrote that criminals "possess souls and bodies composed
of the same materials as those of our friends and relations. They are bone of their bone,
and were originally fashioned with the same spirits." B. RUSH, supra note 10, at 7.
18 See T. DUMM, DEMOCRACY AND PUNISHMENT: DISCIPLINARY ORIGINS OF THE UNITED
STATES 87-105 (1987). The "humanitarian" aspect even of humanitarians can be exag-
gerated, however. Several scholars have noted that the humanitarian movement was in
many ways a conservative one, designed to enforce traditional behaviors by elite mem-
bers of society who had much to lose from a more open and less structured society. See
C. GRIFFIN, THEIR BROTHERS' KEEPERS: MORAL STEWARDSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES,
1800-1865 (1960); Lewis, The Reformer As Conservative: Protestant Counter-Subversion in the




2. The Need for Order
While the idealistic ideologies of republicanism and humanitari-
anism were clearly influential in its rise, 19 the penitentiary also won
acceptance because of its promise as a powerful new institution of
state coercion. America's need for order in the decades following
the Revolution was in part psychological. Americans were acutely
aware of the experimental nature of their national undertaking and
the extent to which they had abandoned the traditional stabilizing
forces of state church, aristocracy, and king. The nation also exper-
ienced the destabalizing effect of significant demographic change.
Immigration, urbanization, and migration presented concrete
threats to order in the republic. 20
During the eighteenth century the population of the colonies
grew and changed in makeup and distribution. The greatest growth
came from low-status immigrants, such as slaves, transported
criminals, indentured servants, and laborers. These persons were
widely blamed for increased criminal activity.2 1 American cities saw
dramatic growth prior to the Revolution, a growth accompanied by
increased crime. 22 In the years before the Revolution, the colonial
criminal justice system showed signs of increasing stress. Through-
out the eighteenth century the prosecution of moral offenses such as
gambling, drunkenness, and sexual misconduct declined in most
colonies while the prosecution of crimes of violence and against
property increased.23 Meanwhile, there was a general increase in
the severity of punishments authorized by law and those actually in-
flicted. 24 This pattern, in combination with contemporary com-
plaints about the rise in crime, suggests that the criminal justice
system was forced by circumstance to concentrate upon more seri-
ous criminal threats than it had previously encountered.2 5 Even
Massachusetts, whose population had been among the most stable
19 For example, the failure of the South to implement the penitentiary on a wide-
spread basis may be linked, in part, to the relative lack of appeal of both of these ideolo-
gies in that region. See M. HINDUS, PRISON AND PLANTATION: CRIME, JUSTICE AND
AUTHORITY IN MASSACHUSETTS AND SOUTH CAROLINA, 1767-1878 (1980).
20 See L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 298-99.
21 Preyer, Penal Measures in the American Colonies: An Overview, 26 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
326, 352 (1982).
22 See C. BRIDENBAUGH, CITIES IN REVOLT: URBAN LIFE IN AMERICA, 1743-1776 110-
13, 299-303 (1955) (discussing the rise of professional crime in pre-Revolution cities).
23 Greenberg, Crime, Law Enforcement, and Social Control in Colonial America, 26 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 293 (1982); Preyer, supra note 21, at 341-43.
24 Masur, supra note 11, at 22; Preyer, supra note 21, at 339.
25 See Greenberg, supra note 23, at 315; D. GREENBERG, CRIME AND LAW ENFORCE-




and homogeneous and had enjoyed the most effective criminal jus-
tice systems of the colonies, suffered a significant crime problem af-
ter the 1750s. 2
6
After the Revolution, the situation became worse. Many Ameri-
cans realized that the criminal justice system they had inherited
from the English was inadequate for the basic task of deterring
crime. 27 Part of the problem was that demographic change had un-
dermined the effectiveness of the traditional, community-based pun-
ishments. Corporal methods punished not only through physical
pain but through public humiliation. They relied upon the power of
community approbation. These methods lost impact when wayward
community members could simply pick up and move to another
community following punishment.
28
In the first stage of penal reform, from 1790 to approximately
1815, the need for order remained a secondary theme in penal re-
form. Legislatures altered penal codes to replace or supplement
corporal punishments with a proportioned scale of prison terms.
The presumption of reformers was that reform of the law would be
sufficient to cure most penal ills. During this period reformers cele-
brated the benevolence and moral enlightenment of penal change.29
By 1815, however, even reformers took a darker view of the penal
problem.
By the second decade of the nineteenth century demographic
change had accelerated. The cities grew dramatically. From 1790
to 1830 Philadelphia's population tripled; New York's population
grew even faster, rising from 33,000 to 215,000.30 As before, crime
centered in urban areas 31 and was blamed on immigrants from over-
seas.32 The disorders of the city were especially disturbing to a peo-
26 Hirsch, From Pillory to Penitentiary: The Rise of Criminal Incarceration in Early Massachu-
setts, 80 MIcH. L. REV. 1179, 1220-30 (1982).
27 See O.F. LEwIs, supra note 6, at 9.
28 Hirsch, supra note 26, at 1232-34. Contemporaries tended to blame the problem
on persons from outside the local community - those who came from other localities or
from overseas; there was an increase in the numbers of both, especially after 1750. Id. at
1229-31. See also Kealey, Patterns of Punishment. Massachusetts in the Eighteenth Century, 30
AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 163, 185 (1986). It is also possible that corporal punishment lost
effectiveness as it became seen as a barbarous method. For a similar argument with
regard to the English use of whippings and brandings during the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries, see M. IGNATIEFF, supra note 6, at 90-91.
29 See supra notes 10-18.
30 P. BOYER, URBAN MASSES AND MORAL ORDER IN AMERICA, 1820-1920 4 (1978) (cit-
ing Taylor, American Urban Growth Proceeding the Railway Age, 27 J. ECON. HisT. 309, 311
(1967)).
31 See G. DE BEAUMONT & A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 6, at 16-17.
32 E.g., S. KNAPP, THE LIFE OF THOMAS EDDY 65-66 (1976) (quoting New York re-
former Eddy as blaming an increase in crime in the early nineteenth century on growth
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ple who had pegged their hopes for the moral virtue of the republic
on a Jeffersonian rural society. Contemporaries saw another threat
to general stability in the mass migration of citizens from the civi-
lized East to the wilderness West.3 3 In the East, ordering institu-
tions were weak; in the West they were virtually nonexistent.
The penitentiary's potential as a stabilizing force in early Amer-
ican society was substantial. It represented the modem state's first
major expansion of power over the individual. 34 While England still
relied on the terror of harsh, unpredictable penalties to keep a res-
tive population in order,35 America devised a method for mass re-
moval of wrongdoers from society to places where punishment was
not only painful, but lengthy. The penitentiary centralized the
state's power, bringing punishment under the state's direct control
instead of diffusing it among the cities, towns, and villages. The
penitentiary replaced corporal punishment's brief encounter be-
tween offender and state with a penalty that could last for years. In
theory at least, the penitentiary gave the state the ultimate power
over criminal offenders-the power to remake them.
The penitentiary also satisfied the public's emotional need for
tough and dramatic retaliation against criminals. By the second dec-
ade of the nineteenth century, reform rhetoric turned harsh.3 6 Even
the most optimistic reformers agreed on the need for ruthless meas-
ures to crush the spirit of prisoners. And now the voices of those
who did not believe in prisoner reformation, but emphasized pun-
ishment as retaliation, grew louder.
3 7
Developments in the state of New York, which became the na-
tion's leader in penal reform, illustrate the trend. New York's pris-
ons represented a major governmental problem. A mutiny at New
York City's Newgate prison prompted the legislature in 1819 to take
the critical step of authorizing corporal punishment to maintain
prison discipline.38 This allowed prison authorities to use whips,
prison irons, stocks, and other corporal measures to keep prisoners
in population, increase in wealth, and large number "of indigent and vicious emigrants
from Europe and the West Indies.")
33 See P. BOYER, supra note 30, at 6.
34 See M. IGNATIEFF, supra note 6; M. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH (A. Sheridan
trans. 1977); D. ROTHMAN, supra note 6.
35 See Hay, Property, Authority and the Criminal Law, in ALBION'S FATAL TREE 17 (D. Hay
ed. 1975).
36 Hirsch, supra note 26, at 1259; see also Heale, Humanitarianism in the Early Republic:
The Moral Reformers of New York, 1776-1825, 2J. AM. STUD. 161, 171-72 (1968).
37 W. LEWIS, supra note 6, at 82-83.
38 See M. GLENN, supra note 10, at 11; W. LEWIs, supra note 6, at 46.
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in order. A major distinction between the new order and the old
had been erased.
Meanwhile, the state opened a major new prison at Auburn,
New York which was to become a model for penitentiaries through-
out the country. The most influential legislators in the creation of
Auburn, Stephen Allen and Samuel M. Hopkins, took a harsh view
of punishment. Allen claimed that criminals " 'had not the same
claim upon our commiseration that the honest and unfortunate part
of our species have,' " and that " 'the reformatory plan, or the sys-
tem of attention, kindness, and forbearance has failed, and will fail,
wherever, or whenever it is put into operation.' "39 Allen admired
Connecticut's prison, a converted copper mine where inmates were
held in dungeons deep in the earth.40 Hopkins strongly believed
that inmate life in the state's prisons was too easy and should pro-
duce more terror and suffering.4 1 The Auburn prison fulfilled Allen
and Hopkins' penal vision.
New York penal authorities initially experimented with a partic-
ularly harsh form of solitary confinement at Auburn, but when that
proved disastrous,42 authorities were forced to create their own sys-
tem of prison discipline. This was supplied, not by persons con-
cerned with the salvation of prisoners or the larger issues of
punishment, but by the men charged with running the prison-War-
den Elam Lynds and his second in command, John D. Cray. Lynds
and Cray created an extraordinary system of mass repression as
their solution to the prison crisis. Under their silent, or congregate,
system, prisoners labored together during the day in absolute si-
lence under the unceasing surveillance of guards. They wore dis-
tinctive striped clothing. Prisoners moved through the prison in
lockstep, a kind of mass shuffle with prisoners' heads turned to the
side and hands placed on the shoulders of those before them to
maintain rank and prevent conversation. So rigidly was this en-
forced that some prisoners released after many years continued to
move in lockstep by force of habit. At night prisoners were housed
in solitary cells, the rules of silence still in force. The regimen was
39 W. LEWIS, supra note 6, at 82 (citingJ. HARDIE, THE HISTORY OF THE TREAD-MILL
(1824) (quoting Stephen Allen)).
40 Id.
41 Id. at 83.
42 The rigors of this experiment illustrate the changing attitudes toward incarcera-
tion. Some 80 "hardened" criminals were placed in a specially designed wing of the
prison for more than a year and a half, during which time they had no human contact,
although they were provided with food, water, and medical care. By the time of their
release, several had gone insane, a number had died and one prisoner attempted suicide
immediately upon being let out of his cell. See id. at 68-70.
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maintained by generous applications of corporal punishment.43
Auburn provided the disciplinary model for most American
penitentiaries. 44 Its main rival was the Pennsylvania, or separate,
system. Under the separate system inmates worked and slept in soli-
tary confinement. Advocates believed that physical separation bet-
ter prevented inmates from corrupting each other. The great pride
of the separate system was its shunning of the whip as a disciplinary
tool, but the methods used in its stead were also corporal and se-
vere. Prison officials could punish wayward prisoners with repeated
outdoor dunkings with buckets of cold water in all weather, confine-
ment in a "tranquilizing chair" (a kind of stocks which caused severe
swelling of the arms and limbs), use of straitjackets which were laced
so tight that necks and faces turned black with congealed blood, and
by gagging prisoners with an iron device that could be life-threaten-
ing.45 Throughout the reform period, promoters celebrated the
penitentiary as a benevolent development, but those consigned to
its walls, under both the New York and Pennsylvania systems, found
it a far more severe punishment than the "barbarities" it replaced. 46
3. Institutional Interests
Although the transformation of the penitentiary from a benevo-
lent to a repressive institution reflected a change in public philoso-
phy, much of the change may be attributed to the pragmatic
concerns of penal officials. Especially in the second phase of the
penitentiary's creation, the most important influence upon the prac-
tice of American punishment may have been the need to maintain
order within penal institutions. The nation's first prisons featured
overcrowding and riots. In order to regulate prison populations
and maintain order, governors liberally granted pardons to prison-
ers. Meanwhile, few offenders left prison reformed. Although
costly additions to state and local budgets, prisons appeared to do
43 Auburn and especially Sing Sing, the next New York prison built, became infa-
mous for guards' liberal use of the whip against disobedient prisoners. See M. GLENN,
supra note 10, at 34-36; O.F. LEwIs, supra note 6, at 94-96, 113-15; W. LEWIS, supra note
6, at 87-100, 136-156.
44 B. McKELVEY, supra note 6, at 28-30. It was celebrated not only by prison adminis-
trators, but by penal reformers. Its greatest proponent was Louis Dwight, a New Eng-
land Congregational preacher and founder of the Boston Prison Society. Dwight
personified the connection between the humanitarian movement and the conservative,
crime suppressant theme in Jacksonian penal reform. See Lewis, supra note 18, at 83.
Dwight sought to extend the Auburn model of discipline to a wide range of nonpenal
institutions. Id.
45 O.F. LEWIs, supra note 6, at 220-23.
46 LIEBER, Preface to G. DE BEAUMONT & A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 6, at xvii-xix.
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little more than educate their inmates in crime and harden them to a
criminal career.
47
The disciplinary system inaugurated at Auburn was geared
more to institutional needs than reformation or even crime deter-
rence. Lynds' main concern was to render the prisoner docile and
pliable during his prison stay. What happened to the prisoner after
release was of less moment.48
Institutional economics played a critical role in shaping the na-
ture of incarceration. Prisons cost a great deal more than corporal
punishment, unless they could be made to pay for themselves
through convict labor. Although prison reformers argued bitterly
over the relative humanity and reformative effectiveness of the Au-
burn and Pennsylvania systems, Auburn's most convincing claim to
superiority was simply that it cost less.49 Despite reformers' appeals
to the ideal of reformation, political leaders proved loathe to spend
public money on criminals, even for religious or educational train-
ing.50 The success of a prison administration depended not on pris-
oner reformation, but on the institutional balance sheet. A warden
who could make his prison pay its own way or, better yet, turn a
profit, was widely celebrated. One means of turning a profit was to
hire out prisoners to private employers. Such employers had no in-
terest in, nor made any effort to achieve, convict reformation. 51
By the mid-nineteenth century, most states had penitentiaries,
but as institutions they differed greatly from the visions of the first
American reformers. While in design and rhetoric they were dedi-
cated to the benevolent reformation of their inmates, life within
them was dominated by the custodial needs of the institution. 52
Prisoners could be punished for institutional infractions at the whim
of guards in a fashion as brutal as most corporal punishment used
during the colonial era. Punishment had been dramatically
47 See id. at 35; T. DUMM, supra note 18, at 106; W. LEwIs, supra note 6, at 56-63; D.
ROTHMAN, supra note 6, at 93-94.
48 W. LEWIS, supra note 6, at 100-03. See G. DE BEAUMONT & A. DE TOCQUEVILLE,
supra note 6, at 199-205 (conversation with Mr. Elam Lynds).
49 W. LEwis, supra note 6, at 109-10. The first mass institutions to implement the
Pennsylvania system were extraordinarily costly. The state's model Cherry Hill facility
cost $1,648 per prisoner, a fearsome sum in the early nineteenth century. T. DUMM,
supra note 18, at 106.
50 See W. LEWIS, supra note 6, at 101-02.
51 Id. at 153-55; B. McKELvEY, supra note 6, at 21; Miller, At Hard Labor: Rediscovering
the 19th Century Prison, reprinted in POLICE, PRISON, AND PUNISHMENT: MAJOR HISTORICAL
INTERPRETATIONS 495, 501-02 (K. Hall ed. 1987).
52 E.C. WINES & T. DWIGHT, REPORT ON THE PRISONS AND REFORMATORIES OF THE
UNITED STATES AND CANADA (1973).
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changed, but whether it had been reformed was, and is, a much
more difficult question.
B. THE CREATION OF THE CORRECTIONAL SYSTEM, 1870-1920
The second major penal reform movement in the United States
involved the transformation of a punishment system devoted to the
incarceration of adult criminals for determinate sentences to a
multi-faceted system which applied a range of discretionary penal-
ties to a broad range of offenders. Like the punishments they re-
placed, the new penal methods were designed to effect the
reformation of offenders and to protect society, but now punish-
ment would be scientifically designed. As before, penal change be-
gan with the definition of a moral ideal. As before, the adoption of
new penal methods owed much to the prospect that the new punish-
ments would suppress crime more effectively than the old. As
before, the implementation of the new methods was influenced
more by the interests of penal institutions than any penal ideology.
The penal changes which comprised the creation of a correc-
tion system began in the latter part of the nineteenth century and
occurred at an accelerated pace in the first two decades of the twen-
tieth. During this period, the basic means of punishing crime
evolved from a determinate sentence set by a judge, subject only to
the executive's pardoning power, to an indeterminate sentence,
where the precise term of incarceration depended upon administra-
tive authorities. Such indeterminacy came in two forms: 1) the ex-
plicitly indeterminate sentence, where the sentencing judge set a
minimum and maximum term and left the final decision on length of
incarceration to penal authorities and 2) the implicitly indetermi-
nate sentence, where the judge set a maximum prison term that was
usually reduced by a parole board.
53
By the end of the reform period, most adult prisoners faced a
period of parole supervision after leaving prison. Reformers devel-
oped another noncarceral penalty-probation-which could replace
or supplement penal confinement for adult or juvenile offenders.
Reformers pushed the development of new varieties of incarceral
institutions, such as adult reformatories, juvenile reformatories, ju-
venile "homes," and detention centers. Finally, beginning at the
53 Usually the administrative authority determining actual length of incarceration
under an explicitly indeterminate scheme was also a parole board. The main difference
between the two approaches was whether the indeterminacy of sentence was explicit or
implicit. See Lindsey, Historical Sketch of the Indeterminate Sentence and Parole System, 16 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 9 (1926).
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turn of the century, a number of jurisdictions developed separate
juvenile justice systems to handle young offenders. By 1920, most
jurisdictions had separate courts, probation officers, and detention
centers for youths who committed crimes.5 4
1. Moral Idealism-The Science of Punishment
Many of those leading the fight for penal reform in the second
half of the nineteenth century, and to a lesser extent in the early
twentieth century, saw penal reform as part of their duty to bring
Christian salvation to the unfortunate. 55 The reform ideology they
espoused, however, was secular. The central appeal of the idealists
who championed each of the correctional innovations was to the
newest and brightest of intellectual lights-science.56 Science gave
substance to the new reformative ideal. 57
The predominance of science in nineteenth century public
thought began after the Civil War with the work of Charles Darwin.
In the late nineteenth century, Darwin's The Origin of the Species was
taken as the basis for the widely influential social policies of Herbert
Spencer and William Graham Sumner.58 In addition, many of the
social sciences, including sociology and psychology, trace their
54 For a summary account of these changes, see S. WALKER, POPULARJUSTICE 76-102
(1980). For essentially chronological accounts of the indeterminate sentence and pa-
role, see Lindsey, supra note 53; 4 ATr'Y GEN. SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES, PAROLE
1-25 (1939). In contrast to the republican and Jacksonian periods, scholars have not
thoroughly explored penal change in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
In part, this lack of coverage may stem from the size of the subject. Instead of the devel-
opment of a handful of prisons in several key states within a 40 year span, later reforms
involved the creation of a variety of new penal methods and institutions in jurisdictions
across the United States over some 65 years. As a result, this Article's historical discus-
sion of this period rests upon a less secure historical footing than that of the creation of
the penitentiary. The only modern historical analysis of the full range of correctional
innovations is found in D. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE (1980). Forjuve-
nile justice, see R. MENNEL, THORNS & THISTLES: JUVENILE DELINQUENTS IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1825-1940 (1973); A. PLATr, THE CHILD-SAVERS (1969); S. SCHLOSSMAN, LOVE
AND THE AMERICAN DELINQUENT: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PROGRESSIVE' JUVENILE
JUSTICE, 1825-1920 (1977).
55 For the combination of religious motivation and scientific emphasis in early re-
formers of this period, see, for example, Z. BROCKWAY, FIFTY YEARS OF PRISON SERVICE
(1912); E.C. WINES, THE STATE OF PRISONS AND CHILD-SAVING INSTITUTIONS IN THE CIVI-
LIZED WORLD 49-56 (1880).
56 The emphasis upon science rather than upon religion became especially pro-
nounced during the Progressive era when most reforms were adopted. See, e.g., H.
BoIEs, THE SCIENCE OF PENOLOGY 3-7 (1901); Wigmore, General Introduction to the Modern
Criminal Science Series, in R. SALEILLES, THE INDIVIDUALIZATION OF PUNISHMENT V-ix (R.
Jastrow trans. 1913). See also CORRECTION AND PREVENTION (C. Henderson ed. 1910).
57 The reformative ideal, later termed the rehabilitative ideal, is used here as a short-
hand description of the penal vision of correctional reformers.
58 R. HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINISM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT 4-12 (1955).
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modern origins to the establishment of new academic departments
at American universities at this time. The newly trained social scien-
tists urged the primacy of the scientific method in attacking all social
ills.59
An even greater boost to the scientific outlook came from a fun-
damental transformation of medical and biological science. By the
end of the nineteenth century, for the first time in the history of
mankind, medical science could claim a clear superiority to all other
methods of treating disease. Advances in microbiology in the 1860s
and 1870s led to discoveries about the nature of disease transmis-
sion and infection, while the development of immunology trans-
formed the fight against disease. The discovery of antiseptics, in
combination with earlier work on anesthetics, radically altered the
nature of surgery. Between 1870 and 1920, diseases such as small-
pox, typhoid, tuberculosis, diphtheria, typhus, malaria, and yellow
fever were either checked or eliminated in much of the Western
world. Life expectancy for all age groups up to the age of forty-five
significantly increased. With this record of success, it should be no
surprise that when penal reformers sought an intellectual frame-
work for punishment, they turned to science, and particularly the
example of medicine.60
The rhetoric of penal reform during this period relied heavily
upon that of medicine. Crime was described as a disease suffered by
the offender; what followed conviction should be its cure. The of-
fender was not a sinner but a sick person, a patient in the care of the
physician state.6' In its strongest form, idealist ideology of the pe-
riod rejected the notion of criminal responsibility, arguing that
crime was an act beyond the control of the criminal and that the
59 See L. HARTSFIELD, THE AMERICAN RESPONSE TO PROFESSIONAL CRIME, 1870-1917
150-188 (1985); R. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER, 1877-1920 121 (1967). For the link
between social science development and criminal justice reforms, see Haney, Criminal
Justice and the Nineteenth-Century Paradigm: The Triumph of Psychological Individualism in the
"Formative Era," 6 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 191 (1982).
60 R. SHRYOCK, THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN MEDICINE 304-327 (1936). The exam-
ple of early penal reformer and prominent physician Benjamin Rush illustrates the swift
advance of medical science during the nineteenth century. At the time of his death in
1813, Dr. Rush, who was one of the early leaders of the penitentiary movement, was also
America's most respected physician. His research had led him to believe that humans
suffered from but one disease, which came in many varieties, and which was best treated
by blood-letting and purging. Within 30 years his work was dismissed as nonsense. Id.
at 1-2. Although the Enlightenment had included important scientific advances, and the
language of science was a central part of its rhetoric, its scientific achievements paled
before those of the nineteenth century. The Englightenment was not a scientific move-
ment in the modem, popular sense. Cf. P. GAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT, AN INTERPRETA-
TION: THE SCIENCE OF FREEDOM (1969).
61 See, e.g., D. ROTHMAN, supra note 54, at 56-57.
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attempt to apportion punishment according to its severity was not
only hopeless, but a throwback to the primitive retributivism of ear-
lier times.62' Idealists urged that punishment be forward-thinking
and rational, and derided retribution's "passion" and past focus. 63
Reformers argued that punishment should concentrate on the
criminal, not the crime. Punishment should be individualized to ef-
fect the particular criminal's reformation. The new basis for judicial
decisionmaking would be the presentence report, a social science
document providing a wealth of information about the offender.
Yet, whatever the judge decided was appropriate, his would not be
the last word. Idealists successfully argued that the extent of pun-
ishment should be largely determined by social science experts,
such as parole authorities.64 Some penal "treatment" would not re-
quire incarceration. Reformers argued that probation and parole
would permit the state to effect reformation without the recognized
disadvantages of an institutional setting. For other offenders, re-
formers advocated treatment in new institutions, such as juvenile
detention centers and reformatories and reformatories for young
men and young women. 6
5
Reformers acknowledged the difficulty of offender reformation.
The roots of crime were deep and complex-in the urban environ-
ment, in psychology and in genetics. Yet, reformers had faith in the
scientific method; rigorous study and analysis would eventually re-
veal all. In the meantime, they would act on what they did know.66
This faith in science w~as instrumental; the scientific approach was
best because it represented the means to the most peaceful and or-
62 Any effort to apportion punishment to degree of guilt "is but organized lynch law"
and the abandonment of retribution is "the first condition of a civilized criminal juris-
prudence." Lewis, The Indeterminate Sentence, 9 YALE LJ. 17, 19 (1899). Science would
guide to a humanitarian result. "While the unthinking still clamor for savage penalties
in proportion to their ignorance and aloofness from the actual problem, those who see
actual offenders in the light of science and the spirit of the Golden Rule, now see the
futility of the old procedure." Lyon, Editorial, 16 J. GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 5, 15
(1926).
63 Lewis, supra note 62, at 17-21; Lyon, supra note 62.
64 Reformers argued that the law should place no restriction on quantity of punish-
ment since the legal categorization of offense bore no relation to the need for or diffi-
culty of rehabilitation. See, e.g., E.C. WINES, supra note 55, at 619-20; Lewis, supra note
62, at 18; Z. BROCKWAY, supra note 55, at 400; Butler, The Released Prisoner, in CORREC-
TION AND PREVENrON 301-39 (C. Henderson ed. 1910). All jurisdictions, however,
placed some legal limit on the indeterminacy of sentencing. See Lindsey, supra note 53,
at 52-58, 64-69.
65 See A. PLATr, supra note 54, at 46-74. For a general overview of the theory of
reformation, see H. BARNES & N. TEETERS, NEW HORIZONS IN CRIMINOLOGY: THE AMER-
ICAN CRIME PROBLEM (1946).
66 See D. ROTHMAN, supra note 54, at 45-47.
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derly, the most compassionate and the most productive society im-
aginable. Scientific punishment would make the nation better.
67
In making punishment more scientific, reformers also made it
more discretionary and less bound by legal constraints. The main
legal actor, the judge, would set only the outer bounds of punish-
ment. The most important penal determinations would be made by
nonlegal penal experts-parole and prison authorities. These offi-
cials would make decisions based upon their own scientific exper-
tise, not legal principles. Judges headed the new juvenile justice
system, but reformers envisioned that many of the important deci-
sions would be made by nonlegal probation workers, and that the
judge would operate more as a social worker than a legal function-
ary. 68 In the new correctional system, treatment would override
legal process.
To a remarkable extent, the legal system acquiesced in these
changes. Despite early court decisions which raised constitutional
doubts about the indeterminate sentence 69 and discretionary juve-
nile justice,70 courts soon accepted the rationale of reformation and
legitimated the power of discretionary administrative authorities.
7'
Appellate courts sanctioned the new punishments on the ground
that they were for the benefit of those to be "treated." Unfortu-
nately, the new "treatment" frequently turned out to be a superficial
reworking of the old ways of custodial incarceration.
2. The Need for Order
As had been true with the creation of the penitentiary, the cor-
rectional system filled a perceived need for new and more effective
67 See supra note 56.
68 See D. ROTHMAN, supra note 54, at 212-18.
69 See, e.g., People v. Cummings, 88 Mich. 249, 50 N.W. 310 (1891) (striking down
Michigan indeterminate sentence law).
70 See, e.g., People v. Turner, 55 Ill. 280, 287-88 (1870) (laws providing for the com-
mittment of minors who have committed no crime held unconstitutional). But see Ex
parte Crouse, 54 Pa. 9, 11 (1838) (upholding juvenile committment to House of Refuge
on parens patriae grounds).
71 On indeterminate sentence and parole, see the following: George v. People, 167
Ill. 447, 47 N.E. 741 (1897) (upholding Illinois indeterminate sentencing act); Common-
wealth v. Brown, 167 Mass. 144, 45 N.E. 1 (1896) (upholding Massachusetts indetermi-
nate sentencing); State v. Peters, 43 Ohio 629, 4 N.E. 81 (1885) (upholding Ohio parole
law).
On commitments to juvenile institutions without full criminal trial, see the follow-
ing: In re Sharp, 15 Idaho 26 (1908); Petition of Ferrier, 103 Ill. 367 (1882) (limiting
previous decision in Turner, supra note 70); Marlowe v. Commonwealth, 142 Ky. 106
(1911); State v. Ray, 63 N.H. 406 (1885); Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48 (1905);
Mill v. Brown, 31 Utah 473, 88 P. 609 (Utah 1907); R. MENNEL, supra note 54, at 124-25,
144-47; D. ROTHMAN, supra note 54, at 231-35.
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institutions to preserve civic order. As before, the main threats to
disorder were an influx of immigrants combined with the growth of
American cities. Although instances of disorder appeared to dimin-
ish during the time of correctional system reforms, changes in social
expectations and the ,unsettling nature of demographic change,
heightened demand for institutions that could enforce public order.
a. Threats to Order
Throughout the late nineteenth century, America experienced
unprecedented immigration. From 1870 to 1900 more than eleven
million immigrants came to America. Then immigration increased,
with seventeen million new residents entering the country from
1900 through 1917.72 The threat of the foreigner became a con-
stant theme in political and social life.73 Foreigners were also the
focus of most criminal justice efforts. First and second generation
immigrants comprised a disproportionate segment of prison popu-
lations by the turn of the century.74
What made the influx of immigrants particularly frightening to
many Americans was their concentration in urban centers, accelerat-
ing the already disturbing trend toward urbanization. In the first
two decades of the twentieth century, the basic geographic arrange-
ment of the populace shifted. During this time New York City ad-
ded 2.2 million residents, and Chicago added a million.75 By 1920,
for the first time in the nation's existence, more Americans lived in
urban areas than rural. During the nineteenth century the city be-
came enshrined in the American imagination as the center of pov-
erty, corruption, and evil. 76 Violence and disorderly conduct, which
had been prominent parts of the urban scene since the 1830s, con-
tinued to plague the cities and created a sense of urban menace in
the minds of middle class Americans. 77 The foreign-born poor,
packed into the cities' ghettos, comprised a "dangerous class,"
threatening to public order on a number of grounds.78 By 1900,
first or second generation immigrants comprised sixty percent of
the population of the nation's twelve largest urban centers.7 9
72 P. BOYER, supra note 30,- at 189.
73 SeeJ. HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND (1966).
74 P. BOYER, supra note 30, at 189.
75 See D. ROTHMAN, supra note 54, at 23-24.
76 See P. BOYER, supra note 30.
77 See id. at 125-130.
78 See, e.g., C.L. BRACE, THE DANGEROUS CLASSES OF NEW YORK AND TWENTY YEARS
WORK AMONG THEM (1872); L. HARTSFIELD, supra note 59,
79 P. BOYER, supra note 30, at 123.
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The urban-based foreigner did not represent the only threat to
public order. Prominent in the pantheon of public enemies during
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was a new criminal
type-the professional. Muckraking journalists, enterprising aca-
demics, and novelists targeted those who made a career of crime.8 0
The public thrilled and trembled at the exploits of such evil-doers.
The professional criminal, an individual dedicated to social disrup-
tion, seemed the most dangerous member of the dangerous classes.
At this juncture, it is important to distinguish between per-
ceived and actual threats to order. Although statistics for the period
make definitive judgment impossible, there is evidence of a decline
in crime in America during the nineteenth century.8 1 Certainly, the
period of greatest reform activity, 1900-1915, was not a time of high
crime, nor a period of particularly great fear of crime.8 2 Instead,
this period saw what has been called a "revolution of rising expecta-
tions," in which Americans came to demand a more orderly society
than they had previously known. 83 In many ways, from professional
police to professionalized government to temperance, Americans
sought to give the state more authority to maintain order.
8 4
b. Addressing the Need for Order
Promoters of correctional reforms addressed the need for order
in several ways. Reformers acknowledged that criminals were dan-
gerous and that society had to protect itself against them. In fact,
reformers made this an essential plank of their platform, arguing
that penal "treatment" should focus solely upon dangerousness to
the exclusion of legal concepts of responsibility. Offenders, they ar-
gued, should be neutralized and treated until they were rendered
safe. Thus, while reformers insisted upon the primacy of reforma-
tion, they explicitly and without legal limitation accepted the need
of society for order and the necessity of using punishment to sup-
press crime.
Reformers went further and acknowledged that a certain seg-
ment-a small segment, they contended-of the criminal population
80 L. HARTSFIELD, supra note 59.
81 See S. WALKER, supra note 54, at 104-05; R. LANE, POLICING THE Crr: BOSTON,
1822-1885 125-29 (1967).
82 One historian of crime has argued that the ability of ordinary citizens to handle
civic disorder during the nineteenth century declined, even as the amount of crime may
have fallen. Disorder within the city center and the new professional crime presented
threats beyond the means of citizen self-help, thus requiring increased state interven-
tion. R. LANE, supra note 81, at 221-29.
83 S. WALKER, supra note 54, at 104.
84 See R. WIEBE, supra note 59.
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was incorrigible and could not be reformed. These persons, they
argued, should be confined indefinitely, regardless of their offense.
They should be quarantined. 85 Reformers claimed the determinate
sentence was an absurdity because it allowed the release of the dan-
gerous: "as if one should cage a man-eating tiger for a month or a
year, and then turn him loose."' 86 On this point, reformers were
only partially persuasive; although most jurisdictions employed
some form of indeterminate sentence, all terms of incarceration
were limited by legal maximums according to the offense
committed.8
7
Juvenile justice reforms of the period provide particularly strik-
ing examples of the way "benevolent" reform responded to the
need for order. The earliest innovation regarding juvenile delin-
quents was the "house of refuge," where delinquent and dependent
children were sent for safekeeping and reform. New York District
Attorney Hugh Maxwell hailed the creation of the first such refuge
in 1825, because it provided a secure alternative to jail for juvenile
offenders, and thus would discourage juries from their practice of
acquitting young offenders in order to keep them out of adult jails. 88
The early proponents of separate juvenile facilities in Wisconsin at
mid-century were criminal justice officials and newspapermen whose
main concern was preventing crime, not child-saving.89 At the turn
of the century, criminal justice officials supported the new juvenile
justice system in Chicago, where it originated, because of its poten-
tial for providing more effective criminal justice for the young than
the adult system. 90 Fear of the "vicious" child was a powerful mo-
tivator for penal change for reformers and public officials. 91
The creation of a separate juvenile justice system, with its own
courts and incarceral institutions, allowed the state to "treat" a wide
range of young offenders who might otherwise have escaped the
state's penal reach. Juvenile court jurisdiction even extended to the
parents of the wayward young.92 Proponents argued that the new
powers were necessary to effect reformation; in practice they re-
85 See D. ROTHMAN, supra note 54, at 71-72.
86 Lewis, supra note 62, at 18; see also E.G. WINES, supra note 55, at 621.
87 See Lindsey, supra note 53.
88 S. SCHLOSSMAN, supra note 54, at 24. The house bore many of the markings of a
penitentiary, with a daily routine and corporal punishments similar to those at New
York's Auburn and Sing Sing prisons. Id. at 28-31.
89 Id. at 86-88.
90 See D. ROTHMAN, supra note 54, at 229-30.
91 See R. MENNEL, supra note 54, at 31-34, 81-88.
92 R. MENNEL, supra note 54, at 139-46; A. Pirr, supra note 54, at 137-40; S.
SCHLOSSMAN, supra note 54, at 58-60, 168.
1989]
SAMUEL H. PILLSBURY
sulted in more punishment. Although reformers argued that the
new juvenile justice system would end the placement of children in
adult jails93 and reduce the use ofjuvenile reformatories, there was
no reduction in the numbers of juveniles incarcerated in institu-
tions.94 Young delinquents were still sent to state reformatories in
large numbers, 95 but now the availability of local juvenile detention
centers and probation officers permitted the state to impose penal
sanctions on those who did not warrant full institutionalization.
Previously, these cases might have been dismissed entirely.96
A subtext ofjuvenile justice reform was the forcible integration
of the immigrant into American society. From the first juvenile jus-
tice innovation of the period to the last, the proponents of change
were generally upper- and middle-class Protestants, while the
targets of change were the foreign-born poor, often Catholic, and
their children. 97 Like many other reforms of the Progressive era,
the penal changes celebrated middle class, bureaucratic ideals.
98
The juvenile justice system promised to take the most troublesome
and discordant of immigrant youth and remold them along native
middle class lines. It was a way of enforcing the melting pot.
The other correctional reforms of the period served the need
for order in a similar fashion. The creation of probation and parole
gave the state additional coercive powers over offenders. 99 Within
the penitentiary, the indeterminate sentence and parole gave penal
authorities more power over inmates. These sanctions, which were
designed to assist reformation, did not reduce the amount of pun-
ishment inflicted. Sentence length appears to have increased under
the new approach.' 00 Even a seemingly innocuous innovation, like
the presentence report, represented an extension of state power,
providing new information about the offender which permitted sen-
93 A. PLAr, supra note 54, at 123-33.
94 D. ROTHMAN, supra note 54, at 254-58.
95 Many were also sent to adult jails. A. PLATr, supra note 54, at 146-47.
96 D. ROTHMAN, supra note 54, at 254-58. Once in operation, juvenile courts made
liberal (and clearly punitive) use of short-term detention in juvenile detention centers
followed by probation as a means of combatting delinquency. R. MENNEL, supra note 54,
at 154-88; A. Pt.Ar, supra note 54, at 140-141.
97 R. MENNEL, supra note 54, at 5-6, 14-15, 31-32, 142, 200; A. PLAra, supra note 54,
at 135; D. ROTHMAN, supra note 54, at 19-24. The introduction of the juvenile justice
system depended especially upon the work of middle class women. See A. PLAr, supra
note 54, at 75-100.
98 See R. WIEBE, supra note 59.
99 See Section IIb3 for a discussion of the institutional advantages of probation and
parole.
100 See D. ROTHMAN, supra note 54, at 194-97; S. WALKER, supra note 54, at 157-58.
[Vol. 80
UNDERSTANDING PENAL REFORM
tencing based on noncriminal factors.' 0 1 Finally, all of the adult
criminal justice innovations were motivated in part by their promise
for handling the foreign-born. All were designed to allow authori-
ties the chance to rework the immigrant poor according to the val-
ues of nativist middle-class America.
10 2
For the most part, the correctional system reforms did not di-
rectly address the social need for punishment as symbolic retalia-
tion. In fact, most of these innovations were symbolically
benevolent. Where benevolence seemed generally appropriate, as
with child offenders, innovation provoked little controversy.
10 3
Where harsh treatment was expected, the innovations proved more
controversial, none more so than parole. 10 4 Yet, perhaps because
the correctional system accommodated the social need for harsh
punishment in most cases, the symbolic shortcomings of reform did
not prove fatal.' 0 5 Acceptance of the quarantine concept permitted
the adoption of some particularly harsh penal schemes, such as the
habitual offender statutes enacted in the 1920s, without jeopardiz-
ing the purportedly reformative thrust of the system as a whole.
106
Finally, as set out below, institutional interests strongly supported
the new correctional system, minimizing internal agitation for
change.
c. Institutional Interests
Perhaps no penal reforms have been more popular with, or
more subject to cooption by, institutional interests than those which
comprised the correctional system. The discretionary, nonlegal na-
ture of the new sanctions was attractive to those who would employ
them; it gave them considerable authority and prestige. The juve-
nile court judge, the probation officer, and the parole board mem-
ber were treated as experts whose judgment was subject to few
limits. Yet, because the new penal mechanisms depended so heavily
upon institutional expertise, they were particularly susceptible to in-
stitutional redefinition. This was one reason the reforms were so
attractive to penal officials. Prison wardens welcomed parole and
101 See D. ROTHMAN, supra note 54, at 61-63.
102 See id. at 77, 101-116.
103 Id. at 229-35.
104 Id. at 77-80.
105 Reformers noted with satisfaction that prisoners subject to indeterminate sentence
despised the punishment and vowed to move to determinate sentencing jurisdictions
upon release. See, e.g., Butler, supra note 64, at 306. See D. ROTHMAN, supra note 54, at
80.
106 See Kramer, From "Habitual Offenders" to "Career Criminals'" The Historical Construction
and Development of Criminal Categories, 6 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 273, 276-82 (1982).
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the indeterminate sentence as means of controlling prison popula-
tions, both in numbers and behavior. 10 7 Probation proved an at-
tractive means to the plea-bargained resolution of many cases and
so enhanced the efficiency of the court system.
Best of all, the new punishments promised to be relatively
cheap. The juvenile justice system, with its reliance upon short-
term detention and probation, appeared to provide an inexpensive
alternative to building and maintaining additional reformatories.
108
Similarly, adult probation offered a means of offender control with-
out the considerable expense of institutional confinement.
Once in place, the innovations were to some extent self-perpet-
uating. The correctional system literally created its own defenders:
juvenile and adult probation officers, parole administrators and of-
ficers, and juvenile court judges all owed their livelihood to correc-
tional reforms. They were not likely to question them too closely.
In practice, the reformative ideal quickly succumbed to institu-
tional needs with official discretion primarily informed by custodial
concerns.' 09 Juvenile institutions, because of the strength of their
supposed commitment to reformation, represented the most obvi-
ous failures of the new ways. These institutions became often brutal
and usually dreary places dedicated to human safekeeping.' 10 Penal
institutions generally suffered a dearth of resources and abundance
of offenders. Parole, which originally was designed to allow individ-
ualized reformative treatment, became primarily a means of regulat-
ing inmate populations, with releases decried by law enforcement
officials on grounds of public danger and by reformers on grounds
of inadequate treatment."' Probation became a means for courts
and prosecutors to dispose of large numbers of cases through plea
bargaining. 112 Probation and parole officers, often poorly trained,
were overwhelmed by case loads far exceeding the optimum. Actual
offender supervision was minimal. 113 In the new correctional sys-
107 D. ROTHMAN, supra note 54, at 73.
108 S. SCHLOSSMAN, supra note 54, at 63, 127.
109 For a revealing look at one institution's progression from a reformative to a custo-
dial emphasis, see D. ROTHMAN, supra note 54, at 379-42 1.
110 Id. at 268-83.
111 Interestingly, parole was a more popular innovation than the explicitly indetermi-
nate sentence. Prison administrators desired it for institutional reasons and it proved
politically less controversial than the explicitly indeterminate sentence which was more
closely tied to the reformative ideal. See Lindsey, supra note 53; Messinger, Introduction to
A. VON HIRSCH & K. HANRAHAN, THE QUESTION OF PAROLE: RETENTION, REFORM OR
ABOLITION? xviii-xxvi (1979).
112 See id. at 82-113.
113 See D. ROTHMAN, supra note 54, at 176-77.
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tem, the ideal of reformation proved the least important influence in
the practice of punishment.' 14
The forces which shaped correctional reform in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries were not identical to those
which had shaped the penitentiary nearly a hundred years earlier.
The idealism of correctional reformers was more pragmatic than
that which originally inspired the penitentiary. The most idealistic
of correctional reformers recognized the shortcomings of traditional
prisons and acknowledged society's need for order. The penal
methods introduced by each movement were obviously different, as
was the nation which experienced these reforms. Yet, the similari-
ties between movements remain striking: both were inspired by
moral ideals drawing from contemporary social ideology; both met
the nation's need for order more effectively than their moral ideals;
and both sets of reforms were quickly transformed by institutional
interests. Again, the "practice" of reform differed greatly from the
original vision.
III. THE DETERMINATE SENTENCING MOVEMENT, 1976-1989
In the last fourteen years, many jurisdictions have moved to
make punishment more determinate and more severe. Although re-
cent reforms are not of the same dimension as the creation of the
penitentiary or correctional system, they do signal a basic change in
the nation's penal ideology. As with the reform movements already
considered, the determinate sentencing movement began with a
new vision of penal justice. Idealist reformers promoted an ideol-
ogy of rights which justified punishment on a retributive, deontolog-
ical basis instead of utilitarian principles. These idealists urged
strict legal regulation of punishment to replace the discretionary
methods of correctional reforms and to equalize and reduce the use
of incarceration.
In contrast to earlier reforms, the need for order during recent
years has focused almost entirely on criminal threats 1 5 and has in-
spired an explicit crime control 16 ideology which has challenged
the idealism of early reform proponents. Crime control adherents
have seen punishment as both a deterrent to, and a retribution for,
criminal activity. Part of a conservative political movement, the ide-
114 See id. at 130.
115 But see text Section IIIB.
116 See H. PACKER, THE LIMITs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968) for an early use of
the term "crime control" as a general criminal justice philosophy. For a typical contem-
porary usage applied to punishment, see Thomas & Edelman, An Evaluation of Conserva-
tive Crime Control Theology, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 123 (1988).
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ology of crime control has emphasized the need to increase the se-
verity of punishment as a response to rising crime.
Determinate sentencing reforms have been adopted when con-
servative crime control advocates and liberal idealists have found a
common ground in their determination to change the discretionary,
rehabilitative focus of punishment. In the competition between the
two penal philosophies, however, crime control has proven the
more influential, especially in recent years.
The institutional aspect of recent reform is complex. Many ju-
risdictions have acted to restrict the power of, or eliminate, certain
institutions, particularly the parole board. Meanwhile, other institu-
tional players, primarily prosecutors, legislatures and sentencing
commissions, have gained considerable power. In terms of the in-
fluence of institutions, however, the most important impact is prob-
ably yet to come. Recent penal changes have contribtued to an
enormous expansion in prison populations. Prison demographics
have already played an important role in shaping contemporary
punishment as prison overcrowding has simultaneously undercut
ideological goals and forced new prison construction. If current
trends continue, prison demographics may force more important
changes in the nature of punishment.
A. MORAL IDEALISM-FAIR PUNISHMENT UNDER LAW
The determinate sentencing movement's origins in the early
197 0s may be traced to a new view of punishment which emerged
during that time. In contrast to the earlier emphasis upon offender
reformation (later called rehabilitation), the first proponents of de-
terminate sentencing emphasized punishment's retributive and de-
terrent aspects. Instead of relying upon the informed discretion of
penal experts, reformers have sought to legalize the imposition of
punishment by promulgating determinate rules for sentence length.
If late nineteenth and early twentieth century reformers were en-
thralled with the medical model, their successors have been equally
taken with the legal model. As was true with the creation of the
penitentiary and the correctional system, changes in the view of
punishment grew out of larger ideological change in American
society.
1. The Ideology of Rights
In retrospect, the early 1970s may have marked a watershed in
American politics, a time when many of the basic liberal arguments
first presented in the 1960s were at least superficially accepted by
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establishment America. By this time, the main institutions of gov-
ernment, including the courts, elected officials, and even official bu-
reaucracy, had accepted one of the main planks of the liberal
agenda-the importance of minority rights. For perhaps the first
time in the nation's history, the republican ideal of a democratic na-
tion whose good was determined by utilitarian, majoritarian consen-
sus was challenged. Political, social, and other leaders began to
recognize the essential pluralism of American society. Public policy
became less of a debate about national interests and more of a de-
bate about the relationship between government and individuals,
especially minorities. The notion of individual rights, always impor-
tant in American law, was transformed from a libertarian view,
designed to protect the self-directed, self-confident individual, to
one emphasizing the protection of certain disadvantaged groups
and their members.
The civil rights movement provided the inspiration and model
for ideological change. The acceptance first into law, and then into
political life, of the truth that blacks had suffered a long history of
majoritarian discrimination inspired a new way of seeing the na-
tion's problems. Black civil rights leaders persuasively argued that
racial equality would depend, not on the virtue or self-interest of the
majority, but upon legal rights for minorities. In the 1960s, black
activists and other minority representatives championed the positive
value of differentness. 1 7 The good society, it now appeared, was
not a compromise of all to majoritarian values, but a reconciliation
of majority power with minority rights. The essence of this vision,
which this Article terms the ideology of rights, was a basic value ac-
corded the individual. Under this view, all individuals possess cer-
tain inherent powers against the government which may not be
trumped by arguments about the greatest good for the greatest
number. Even convicted criminals have rights.
2. The Ideology of Rights and the Supreme Court
The most influential proponent of the ideology of rights, has
been the United States Supreme Court. Its origins can be found in
the civil rights movement and the litigation which it brought before
the Court.' 18 During the 1960s and the early 1970s, the Court,
under the leadership of ChiefJustice Earl Warren, undertook a pro-
117 See, e.g., E. CLEAVER, SOUL ON ICE (1968); M. X wrrH A. HALEY, THE AUTOBIOGRA-
PHY OF MALCOLM X (1965).
118 See T. BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS (1988); R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1975);
M. TUSHNET, THE NAACP's LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION (1987).
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cedural revolution in American law. Employing the Constitution's
Bill of Rights, a document which to modem eyes was suffused with
the ideology of rights, the Court reworked the nation's basic law to
protect a wide variety of groups and individuals against the abuses
of government power. The Court expanded the protections of
equal protection in the racial arena and beyond. 1 9 The Court uti-
lized due process to work major changes in the civil law relationship
between government and citizens. 120 The Court also revolutionized
the nation's criminal procedure, creating a new and complex rela-
tionship between state and accused through a variety of federal con-
stitutional rights.'
2'
The Court also began to rethink the nation's punishment sys-
tem. In 1964, the Supreme Court opened federal courthouses to
prisoner litigation by holding that prisoners could bring constitu-
tional actions through the Reconstruction-era civil rights statutes. 122
The federal courts, at both the district and appellate level, aban-
doned a long-standing policy of deference to prison administra-
tors 123 and entertained a series of legal challenges which resulted in
court intervention into prison administration. 24 Informed by the
ideology of rights, the Supreme Court abandoned the deference to
social science expertise which it had displayed earlier 125 and under-
took a careful review of penal decisionmaking. The Court began to
legalize decisionmaking throughout the penal system. The Court
mandated full due process protections for probation and parole rev-
ocations. 126 Even the juvenile justice system, which had been the
119 See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board
of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
120 See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 425 U.S. 319 (1976); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254 (1970).
121 See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 388 U.S. 436 (1966); Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
122 Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964).
123 See Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique ofJudicial Refusal to Review the Com-
plaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963). This note was widely cited by courts in the
doctrinal shift.
124 See, e.g., Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp. 956 (D.R.I. 1974), aff'd, 616 F.2d 598
(1st Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 839 (1980); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 679 (1978);
Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd, Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d
283 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1978). See generally. Creatures, Persons and
Prisoners: Evaluating Prison Conditions Under the Eighth Amendment, 55 S. CAL. L. REv. 1099
(1982) (analyzing case law).
125 See, e.g., Williams v. New York 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
126 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (probation); Morissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471 (1972) (parole revocation).
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stronghold of the discretionary, rehabilitative ideal, was partially le-
galized by the adoption of the beyond a reasonable doubt
standard. 127
3. Retribution and the Ideology of Rights
The Court's doubts about discretionary justice paralleled a
growing skepticism about the rehabilitative ideal. In the early
1960s, several legal scholars noted the ways in which the rehabilita-
tive ideal conflicted with the principle that all persons have certain
legal rights which they may assert against the state.128 Prison distur-
bances, especially the September 1971 uprising at Attica, New York
and its bloody repression, triggered a closer examination of the
state of American prisons and punishment in general. 129 In the
early seventies, a handful of book-length attacks on the rehabilita-
tive ideal in the criminal justice system appeared from a variety of
sources: a prominentjournalist 30 a sitting federal district judge,'
3 '
a former prison warden, 132 and a committee of the American
Friends Services Committee. 133 All sources criticized the indetermi-
nate sentence as unjust and advocated some form of determinate
sentencing. By the mid-seventies, the outcry against the rehabilita-
tive ideal and the call for determinate sentencing became even
stronger.13
4
The early critics of the rehabilitative ideal generally argued that
punishment should be limited by retributive goals. Offenders
127 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
128 See Allen, Legal Values and the Rehabilitative Ideal, 50J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 226
(1959), reprinted in CRIME, LAW AND SOCIETY (A. &J. Goldstein eds. 1971); F. ALLEN, THE
BORDERLAND OF CRIMINALJUSTICE (1964). The rehabilitative ideal had had earlier legal
critics as well. See Cohen, Moral Aspects of the Criminal Law, 49 YALE LJ. 987, 1012-14
(1940).
129 S. WALKER, supra note 54, at 245-48. The uprising left 39 dead and 80 injured.
See ATrICA: THE OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE SPECIAL COMMISSION ON
ATTICA xi (1973); T. WICKER, A TIME TO DIE 1 (1973).
130 j. MITFORD, KIND & USUAL PUNISHMENT (1973).
131 M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1973).
132 D. FOGEL, ... WE ARE THE LIVING PROOF.. .": TheJustice Model for Corrections
(1st ed. 1973).
133 AMERICAN'S FRIENDS SERVICES COMMITTEE, STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE: A REPORT ON
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (1971).
134 See FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT: REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND
TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING (1976); ; N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISON-
MENT (1974); P. O'DONNELL, M. CHURGIN & D. CURTIS, TOWARD A JUST AND EFFECTIVE
SENTENCING SYSTEM: AGENDA FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM (1977); A. VON HIRSCH, DOING
JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS (1976);J. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 181-
204 (1975); see also A. VON HIRSCH & K. HANRAHAN, THE QUESTION OF PAROLE: RETEN-
TION, REFORM OR ABOLITION? (1979); R. SINGER, JUST DESERTS: SENTENCING BASED ON
EQUALITY AND DESERT (1979).
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should be punished only in proportion to the severity of their of-
fenses; that is, only to the extent that they deserve it. Early reform-
ers argued that punishment should not be used for instrumental
reasons such as rehabilitating an offender or indefinitely quarantin-
ing him from society. The key concept for this approach to punish-
ment was justice. Reformers spoke of punishment under the justice
model, justice-as-fairness, 13 5 and just deserts. 136 These idealist re-
formers argued that proportional sentencing might mean shorter
prison terms overall; they agreed it should not result in more
incarceration. 1
37
The reform proposals celebrated legal values. The proposals
relied on the idea that law provides certainty in decisionmaking, an
assumption fundamental to law generally. They reflected a trust in
legislative decisionmaking which is also reflected in the criminal
law's legality principle. 138 The reformers' favorite penal theory, ret-
ribution, largely tracks the assumptions concerning individual re-
sponsibility made by Anglo-American criminal law. Thus, modern
reformers sought to reintegrate punishment with the legal system
and to reduce the criminal justice system's involvement with social
science.13
9
The modern enthusiasm for retribution, a theory of punish-
ment out of favor in academic and professional circles for most of
the nation's history, did not result from any empirical discoveries.
The traditional arguments arrayed against it-that its notion of pro-
portionality cannot be reliably measured in most cases and that it
assumes a measure of individual free will that does not exist in the
real world-were addressed by moral, not factual, argument.' 40 In
fact, one of the great attractions of retribution was that it did not
135 D. FOGEL, supra, note 132, at xi.
136 R. SINGER, supra note 134; A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 134, at 32.
137 See, e.g., FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT, supra note 134, at 32 (urging general re-
duction in prison time). See D. FOGEL, supra note 132, at 238-44; see generally A. VON
HIRSCH, supra note 134, at 106-17 (urging minimal use of incarceration).
138 See, e.g., Keeler v. Superior Court, 2 Cal.3d 619, 470 P.2d 617, 87 Cal. Rptr. 481
(1970).
139 In retrospect, what is remarkable is how long the legal system espoused the reha-
bilitative ideal. The rehabilitative ideal was the product of social science and a determin-
ist, medical approach to crime, an approach fundamentally at odds with the criminal
law's emphasis upon individual morality and free will. For classic examples of the reha-
bilitative ideal in its early and late forms, respectively, see Lewis, supra note 62; K. MEN-
NINGER, THE CRIME OF PUNISHMENT (1966). See also, PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAw
ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE
SOCIETY 392-98, 656-59 (1968).




rely upon empirical evidence for its validity. Nor does retribution
make any claims about making tangible social improvements. It is a
teleological, not instrumental, philosophy.
B. THE NEED FOR ORDER-THE CRIME CONTROL MODEL
More clearly than either of the earlier reforms considered here,
recent penal changes have been driven by a perceived need for har-
sher punishment to restore civil order. No debate about punish-
ment in recent years has been free of the tidal pressure to battle
crime by increasing the severity of punishment.1 41 With the excep-
tion of conservative "law and order" rhetoric during the 1960s and
early 1970s, which embraced concerns about student and minority
unrest,1 42 most of those concerned with issues of order have fo-
cused upon crime control. The crime control model of criminal jus-
tice has presented a conservative alternative to the liberal ideals of
most early reformers.
143
The most important development in criminal justice during the
1960s and early 1970s was the rise in the nation's crime rate. All
crime indicators during this period pointed up, and in dramatic
fashion. According to the Department ofJustice Uniform Crime Re-
ports, the general crime rate-the risk that an individual would be-
come a victim of a crime-rose seventy-four percent from 1966 to
1971. The total number of violent crimes reported increased ninety
percent, and property crimes increased eighty-two percent.144
Americans began to fear for their safety. By the mid-sixties, Ameri-
cans perceived crime as one of the nation's most important issues,
and many urban dwellers changed their living habits in direct re-
sponse to their fears. 145 During the 1960s, however, as the rehabili-
tative ideal experienced a resurgence among correctional officials,
the number of state and federal prisoners actually fell, from a total
of 226,344 in 1960 to 198,831 in 1970.146
141 See S. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF LAW AND ORDER (1984); THE POLrrICS OF
CRIME AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (E. Fairchild & V. Webb eds 1985).
142 See Roesch, Crime as an Issue in American Politics in THE POLrncs OF CRIME AND CRIM-
INAL JUSTICE 25-29 (E. Fairchild and V. Webb, eds. 1985); S. WALKER, supra note 54, at
235-36.
143 The terms liberal and conservative are used here as they are commonly used in
contemporary political debate. See, Roesch, supra note 142; S. SCHEINGOLD, supra note
141.
144 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 2-5 (1971).
145 CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY, supra note 139, at 159-164.
146 See M. CALAHAN, HISTORICAL CORRECTIONS STATISTICS IN HE UNITED STATES,
1850-1984 29 (1986); S. WALKER, supra note 54, at 234. The population figures are of
the nation's prisons on the day of the population survey.
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Crime rates increased through the 1970s. Finally, in the eight-
ies, crime rates leveled off and, in some instances, declined. 147 By
1985 the chance that an American household would be touched by
crime had declined ten peercent from a decade earlier.' 48 Yet,
Americans' fear of crime appeared to increase during the decade.149
Meanwhile, the eighties have seen an increase in prison population
well beyond either the crime rate or general population increase. 1 50
Rising crime provided one motivation for increasing the sever-
ity of punishment. Another came from a general discrediting of co-
erced rehabilitation. The rehabilitative approach had promised to
suppress crime by forcibly changing the criminal propensities of
those it treated. The system's ability to accomplish rehabilitation
had always been disputed; by the mid-seventies, the suspicions were
confirmed. The "Martinson Report," a comprehensive analysis of
studies on rehabilitative programs issued in 1974, concluded that
" 'with few and isolated exceptions,' " forced rehabilitative pro-
grams had " 'no appreciable effect on recidivism.' "151 Although
there had been earlier studies suggesting the same, this report pro-
vided the final blow to the rehabilitative ideal.' 52
The failure of rehabilitation allowed crime control proponents
to promote another utilitarian view of punishment- that its funda-
mental purpose is to deter crime by means of harsh treatment of
criminals. It deters the convict by incapacitation, it deters the public
by the example of his punishment.153 The first of these effects could
not be doubted, as long as crimes committed in prison were not
147 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1973-
1985 (annual reports).
148 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE NATION ON CRIME AND JUSTICE 14 (2d ed.
1988) [hereinafter REPORT TO THE NATION]. The chances of household victimization
were still significant, however, declining from 32%o to 25%.
149 S. SCHEINGOLD, supra note 141, at 39. See generally id. for one explanation of this
phenomenon.
150 Id. at 104-05; see Section IID.
151 Griswold & Wiatrowski, The Emergence of Determinate Sentencing, 47 FED. PROBATION
28, 29 (June 1983) (quoting Martinson, What Works? Questions and Answers About Prison
Reform, 35 PUB. INTEREST 22, 25 (1974). The full scholarly report was published in D.
LIPTON, R. MARTINSON & J. WILKS, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CORRECTIONAL TREATMENT
(1975). But see Martinson, New Findings, New Views: A Note of Caution Regarding Sentencing
Reform, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 243 (1979) (modifying somewhat Martinson's earlier
conclusions).
152 See also Greenberg, The Correctional Effects of Corrections: A Study of Evaluations, in
CORRECTIONS AND PUNISHMENT (D. Greenberg ed. 1977). The inefficacy of the rehabili-
tative approach also made the justice arguments of idealist reformers more compelling.
If rehabilitation worked, many might overlook the lack of relation between offense and
time served. If it did not work, proportionality became the obvious alternative for deter-
mining sentence length.
153 SeeJ. WILSON, supra note 134; E. VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS (1975).
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considered. The second was more controversial but remains one of
the basic assumptions of criminal justice. The crime control ap-
proach to assessing proper punishment emphasized the need for
more severe punishment. Sentence disparity should be eliminated,
proponents urged, because it allowed so many offenders to receive
less punishment than was warranted.
154
The institutional targets of crime control proponents were the
same as those of idealist reformers: judges and parole boards.
Crime control proponents perceived that these groups had been
captured by the rehabilitative ideal and, as a result, were far too le-
nient in their treatment of offenders. Judges gave serious offenders
minimal sentences and parole boards released dangerous criminals
after they had served little time. As a result, society was seriously
and needlessly endangered. 155
Both the ideology of rights and retribution's new respectability
served to legitimate punishment as retaliation. "The purpose of im-
prisonment for crime is punishment," California legislators de-
clared. 156 The crime control model gave emotional and substantive
content to the revival of penal retaliation. Fear of crime generated
anger at offenders, which could now be openly expressed as a desire
for harsher treatment of the convicted. Especially in those states
with a serious crime problem, penal change often included a move
to increase punishment's severity. For example, the first instance of
determinate reform that might be cited was Governor Rockefeller's
mandatory sentencing scheme for drug offenses in New York State
in 1973. In one of the earliest legislative responses to the drug
problem, the state provided for harsh minimum mandatory
sentences for a variety of drug crimes along with a prohibition on
plea bargaining. 157 Throughout the seventies and eighties, the pas-
sage of minimum mandatory penalties for particular crimes, from
drug and sex offenses to violent crimes, represented a popular
means of cracking down on crime.
15 8
154 See Hamm, The Conscience and Convenience of Sentencing Reform in Indiana, 7 BEHAV.
Sci. & L. 107, 108-09 (1989); see also supra note 141 and infra notes 158-59.
155 See Cullen, Bynutn, Garret & Greene, Legislator Ideology and Criminal Justice Policy:
Implications from Illinois, in THE POLITICS OF CRIME AND CRIMINALJUSTICE, supra note 14 1,
at 61-70; Forst, Sentencing Disparity: An Overview of Research and Issues, in SENTENCING RE-
FORM: EXPERIMENTS IN REDUCING DISPARrry 21 (M. Forst ed. 1982); S. SCHEINGOLD,
supra note 141, at 75-153, 169.
156 Cal. Penal Code § 1170(a)(1) (West Supp. 1989).
157 See S. SHANE-DuBow, A. BROWN & E. OLSEN, SENTENCING REFORM IN THE UNITED
STATES: HISTORY, CONTENT AND EFFECT 199-200 (1985).
158 See id. at 280; A. HEINZ, GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSES TO CRIME, LEGISLATIVE RE-
SPONSES TO CRIME: THE CHANGING CONTENT OF CRIMINAL LAW (1982) (tracing relation




In contrast to earlier penal reform movements where the pro-
cess of reform enactment remains poorly understood, we have con-
siderable information about the manner in which determinate
sentencing reforms have been adopted.1 59 Virtually all determinate
sentencing reform involved a basic agreement on the mode of pun-
ishment between moral idealists and crime control proponents.
Where idealists and crime control proponents have differed, in de-
termining the amount of punishment to be inflicted, crime control
advocates have clearly predominated.
By the mid-1970s, almost all who called for penal change
agreed on a few basic points. All agreed that the rehabilitative ideal
had been discredited. All agreed that the worst aspect of the reha-
bilitative ideal was the enormous disparity in sentences which it pro-
duced, a disparity that went beyond the norm of individualized
punishment. 160 Even within the prison system, there was a striking
degree of consensus, with both prisoners and correctional officials
complaining that unchecked discretion in decisionmaking led to un-
fairness.1 61 Reformers even agreed on some general methods for
eliminating disparity and curbing discretion. In order to make pun-
ishment more certain, more equal, more proportionate, and a more
effective deterrent, it would have to be legalized. Only law, with its
moral basis and emphasis upon certainty, could eliminate sentence
disparity. 62 Punishment would be determined not by penologists
159 Social scientists have examined penal reform in a number ofjurisdictions. See, e.g.,
L. GOODSTEIN & J. HEPBURN, DETERMINATE SENTENCING AND IMPRISONMENT - A FAIL-
URE OF REFORM (1985); Hussey & Kramer, Issues in the Study of Criminal Code Revision: An
Analysis of Reform in Maine and California, in DETERMINATE SENTENCING: REFORM OR RE-
GRESSION? 111-31 (1978); Ku, Case Studies of New Legislation Governing Sentencing and Re-
lease, 4 AM. PRISONS &JAILS (1980); Martin, Interests and Politics in Sentencing Reform: The
Development of Sentencing Guidelines in Minnesota and Pennyslvania, 29 VILL. L. REV. 21 (1983-
84); Messinger &Johnson, California's Determinate Sentencing Statute: History and Issues, in
DETERMINATE SENTENCING: REFORM OR REGRESSION? 13-58; Parnas & Salerno, The Influ-
ence Behind, Substance and Impact of the New Determinate Sentencing Law in California, 11 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 29 (1978); RESEARCH ON SENTENCING: THE SEARCH FOR REFORM (A.
Blumstein ed. 1983) [hereinafter RESEARCH ON SENTENCING]; Travis, The Politics of Sen-
tencing Reform, in SENTENCING REFORM: EXPERIMENTS IN REDUC14G DISPARITY 59-85 (M.
Forst ed. 1982).
160 See, e.g., Remington & Newman, The Highland Park Institute on Sentencing Disparity, 26
FED. PROB. 3 (1962); Pilot Institute of Sentencing, 26 F.R.D. 231 (1959). For a general
overview of sentence disparity research, see Forst, supra note 155, at 9-34.
161 Forst, supra note 155, at 23; see also CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS TASK
FORCE TO STUDY VIOLENCE 35-37 (1974); MORRIS & HAWKINS, Attica Revisited: The Pros-
pectfor Prison Reform, 14 ARIZ. L. REV. 747 (1972); Report on Attica, supra note 129, at 3-
95.
162 The reformers' insistence on law as the safeguard of certainty is striking, given its
intellectual context. Law was promoted as certain and determinate at a time when some
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but by lawyer-dominated bodies: legislatures, sentencing commis-
sions, and judges.
While the extent of reform consensus was impressive, it was in-
complete in one important respect: there was little agreement on
how severe the new sentences should be. Should sentences be
equalized at the average present level, at a reduced level, or at a
heightened level? Reformers were deeply split. Liberals charged
that unchecked penal discretion had led to a penal system that was
too harsh while conservatives charged it was too lenient.'63
California, the first state to adopt a comprehensive determinate
sentencing system,164 provides a good example of the political dy-
namic of reform. Since 1917, California had operated one of the
most indeterminate sentencing systems of any state. Ajudge would
designate a broad sentence range, but the actual release date lay
within the discretion of several correctional agencies. By the mid-
1970s, the state's punishment system was under attack from groups
ranging across the political spectrum-from civil liberties and pris-
oner's rights groups, to the state appellate courts, to law enforce-
ment groups.'
65
Prompted by both court decisions holding the state's system of
parole unconstitutional 166 and political outcry over a crime spree by
academics broadly acknowledged the indeterminacy and openness of much of legal lan-
guage. See, e.g., Kress, Legal Indeterminacy, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 283 (1989); Solum, On the
Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 462 (1987). Interestingly,
the problem of sentence disparity had been long recognized. Forst, supra note 155, at
15; Travis, supra note 159, at 60-62. Only in the mid-seventies, when the disparity prob-
lem coalesced with other concerns about the criminal justice system, did it become a
political issue.
163 See S. SCHEINGOLD, supra note 141, at 150; S. WALKER, supra note 54, at 248. For,
liberals saw the excesses of discretionary punishment as illustrated by In re Rodriguez,
14 Cal. 3d 639, 537 P.2d 384, 122 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1975). In that case, the California
Supreme Court ordered the release of a defendant who had served 22 years in state
prison for a sex offense committed while he was a young man. Conservatives were more
impressed by the dramatic criminal depredations of a recently released parolee. See
Messinger & Johnson, supra note 159; Parnas & Salerno, supra note 159, at 31.
164 Maine had earlier made a significant move toward determinacy, but in a less com-
prehensive fashion. Legislators who investigated penal reform decided the rehabilita-
tive approach was too expensive fiscally and politically. Maine politicians recognized a
growing public demand for harsher punishment and focused their reform efforts on the
state parole board. The parole board was perceived as a collection of "ministers and do-
gooders" who were too liberal in releasing prisoners. S. SHANE-DuBow, supra note 157,
at 126-27 (quotingJ. KRAMER, F. HussEY, S. LAGOY, D. KATKIN & C. McLAUGHLIN, As-
SESSING THE IMPACT OF DETERMINATE SENTENCING AND PAROLE ABOLITION IN MAINE
(1978)). In 1976, the state essentially eliminated discretionary parole but did not alter
judicial power over sentencing. See S. SHANE-DuBow, supra note 157, at 125-30.
165 See Messinger &Johnson, supra note 159, at 22 (attacks on state's parole authority);
Parnas & Salerno, supra note 159, at 31.
166 The California Supreme Court in In re Rodriguez, 14 Cal. 3d 639, 652, 537 P.2d
SAMUEL H. PILLSBURY
a recently released parolee, California politicians began to seriously
consider sentencing reform. 167 California's reform package devel-
oped as a compromise measure between prisoners' rights, civil lib-
erties, and law enforcement interests. 168 The common target of
liberal and conservative reformers was the state's parole author-
ity.169 The bill finally approved by the legislature and governor
abolished the state's main parole board and eliminated discretionary
parole except for a small number of offenders already under sen-
tence. Under the new law, judges were to decide between probation
and a low, middle, and high term of incarceration. The law required
judges to give reasons when varying from the middle or base term.
Provisions were also made for sentence enhancements which would
increase sentence length upon proof of certain aggravating factors.
Sentences would also be reviewable on appeal.'
70
The main political battle over reform legislation in California
did not concern sentence length. After an early struggle between
civil liberties and law enforcement interests over sentence lengths, a
package was passed by the legislature and signed by the governor in
September, 1976, to be effective at the beginning of 1977. A further
battle over sentence length took place in the interim, however, re-
sulting in amendments which increased prison terms for some vio-
lent offenses. In the years since adoption, California has modified
the sentencing scheme in a number of respects, generally in the di-
rection of increasing penalties for crimes which have stirred public
anger. 171
Most of the jurisdictions which followed California in enacting
determinate sentencing schemes experienced the same basic pattern
384, 393, 122 Cal. Rptr. 552, 561 (1975), held that the state's main parole authority, the
Adult Authority, could set sentences only in proportion to offender culpability. An at-
tempt to alleviate this flaw through an executive promulgation of guidelines was rejected
by the court of appeals as inconsistent with the state's indeterminate sentencing statute.
In re Stanley, 54 Cal. App. 3d 1030, 126 Cal.Rptr. 524, 128 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1976).
167 See Messinger & Johnson, supra note 159, at 17-29; Parnas & Salerno, supra note
159, at 29-31.
168 See Messinger &Johnson, supra note 159;J. CASPER, D. BRERETON & D. NEAL, THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CALIFORNIA DETERMINATE SENTENCING LAW, 16-17 (1982).
169 See generally Parnas & Salerno, supra note 159, at 31-35 (summary of the Act's
provisions).
170 See Messinger &Johnson, supra note 159, at 38-52; Parnas & Salerno, supra note
159, at 17-29.
171 SeeJ. CASPER, et al., supra note 168, at 4-5; Von Hirsch, Constructing Guidelines for
Sentencing: The Critical Choices for the Minnesota Sentencing Commission, 5 HAMLINE L. REV.
164, 166-67 (1982). Recent plans for revision call for streamlining and restoring pro-
portionality to a scheme which has been complicated and distorted by piecemeal
changes, often in response to particularly outrageous crimes. L.A. DailyJournal, Nov. 4,
1988, at 1, col. 6.
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of consensus-building between conservatives and liberals, with the
original reform package emphasizing just desserts and equality of
sentence, but with the ultimately approved package more oriented
toward crime control. Judicial discretion was sometimes a major
target of reform, at other times not; discretionary parole was usually
severely restricted, if not eliminated. 172 By the end of 1982, a total
of fifteen jurisdictions (including the District of Columbia) had
adopted some form of determinate sentencing.1 73 A total of twenty-
seven jurisdictions had in some fashion tightened parole eligibility,
eight jurisdictions had eliminated parole. t74 The general direction
of reform in terms of length of prison term was illustrated by the
fact that, during the period 1971-1982, forty-nine jurisdictions en-
acted mandatory sentences for certain offenses and thirty-three ju-
risdictions provided for, or increased the severity of, repeat offender
laws.17
5
After more than a decade of debate, the federal government
finally decided upon a determinate sentencing scheme in 1984.176
Although the federal reform process was slower paced than in most
states, its pattern was similar. The stated targets of reform were the
sentence disparities and uncertainties fomented by the rehabilitative
ideal.177 Liberals and conservatives joined forces to make punish-
ment more certain and more fair by eliminating discretionary parole
172 For example, Illinois' determinate sentencing reform began as a 1976 proposal by
one of the earliest rights-oriented reformers, David Fogel, and featured severe restric-
tions upon judicial discretion. The legislation, which was approved in 1978, however,
set only moderate limits on judicial discretion. Its most prominent features were the
abolition of discretionary parole and the creation of a new category of offenses punished
by mandatory prison terms. L. GOODSTEIN &J. HEPBURN, supra note 159, at 56-61. Con-
necticut's original determinate reform package was rejected as too lenient and too re-
strictive of judicial discretion. The law, which went into effect in 1981, abolished all
parole, including post-release supervision, and included a number of minimum
mandatory sentences, but imposed little restriction on judicial sentencing. Id. at 62-69.
Pennsylvania's reform followed the same basic pattern, concluding with a combination
of sentence guidelines and minimum mandatory terms which increased sentence sever-
ity. Cirillo, Windows for Discretion in the Pennsylvania Sentencing Guidelines, 31 VILL. L. REV.
1309-10 (1986); Martin, supra note 159, at 61-99. See also Cullen, supra note 155, at 57-
76 (examining the relationship between ideology and criminal justice policy); Schwerk,
Illinois'Experience with Determinate Sentencing: A Critical Reappraisal, 33 DE PAUL L. REV. 631
(1984)(examining the success of sentencing reform in Illinois in controlling abuses of
discretion).
173 S. SHANE-DuBow, supra note 157, at 280.
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998; Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, §§ 211-239, Pub. L. No.
98-473; 98 Stat. 1987-2040 (1984).
177 S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 38-39, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3182 [hereinafter S. REP. 225]. See also UNITED STATES SENTENCING COM-
MISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A3 (1988) [hereinafter GUIDELINES MANUAL].
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and creating a sentencing commission which would set strict guide-
lines for judicial sentencing.178 Congress avoided the most contro-
versial punishment issues by delegating the determination of
sentence length to an appointed commission. 179
The 1984 sentencing reform was but one of a number of penal
changes the federal government undertook in the eighties. It may
not even have been the most important. The Comprehensive Crime
Control Act of 1984, of which the determinate sentencing bill was a
part, also approved preventive detention of certain defendants,180
and enacted stiff new penalties for certain repeat offenders.18 ' In
1986, new mandatory penalties for narcotics trafficking were en-
acted.18 2 In 1988, Congress passed, and the President signed, a fur-
ther series of increased penalties for narcotics offenses, including a
death penalty for narcotics-related murders.' 83 Meanwhile, the Sen-
tencing Commission's guidelines, approved by Congress in 1987,184
and by the Supreme Court in 1989,185 will also boost the severity of
federal punishment. Although, for certain offenses, the amount of
time spent in prison may be reduced, the guidelines contemplate
that more federal offenders, especially white collar offenders, will go
to prison instead of receiving probation.' 8 6
178 The bill enacted grew out of similar legislation offered by Senator Kennedy and
Senators Thurmond and Laxalt who represented the liberal and conservative wings of
the Senate, respectively. The legislation was also actively supported by the Reagan ad-
ministration. See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 177, at 37-38.
179 The decision to delegate sentence length decisions to a sentencing commission
was designed to obviate a protracted political debate within the legislature over this
divisive issue. See Feinberg, Sentencing Reform and the Proposed Federal Criminal Code, 5
HAMLINE L. REV. 217, 218-19 (1982).
180 18 U.S.C. §§ 3142-43. The bail reform legislation authorized courts to detain de-
fendants in jail before trial on the ground that they might be dangerous to the commu-
nity. The law also made it easier to detain certain defendants on grounds of flight risk.
Although these changes were designated, and have been held to be nonpunitive, they
clearly expanded the government's penal powers. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S.
739 (1987) (upholding the constitutionality of the Bail Reform Act of 1984).
181 28 U.S.C. § 994 (h)
182 21 U.S.C. § 841 (b)(1), § 960(b), amended by Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 86, Pub. L.
No. 99-570, §§ 1002, 1302 (1986), U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3207-2 - 3207-4,
3207-15 - 3207-18.
183 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7001, 1988 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4387 - 4395; see also, id. at §§ 6371 (increased penalty for serious
crack possession); 6452 (life in prison for third-time drug offender); 6454 (enhanced
penalties for offenses involving children); 6460 (enhanced penalty for use of certain
weapons in crime of violence or drug trafficking).
184 18 U.S.C. § 3551.
185 United States v. Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. 647 (1989) (upholding the constitutionality
of the Sentencing Commission and its guidelines).
186 Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises upon Which They Rest,
17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 20-21 (1988).
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While many of those who initially advocated determinate sen-
tencing saw it as a means to restrict state power over individual of-
fenders, the influence of crime control ideology meant that, as
enacted, the impact of sentencing reform on the state's penal power
was more ambiguous. The discretion afforded state decisionmakers
was generally reduced, but the overall severity of punishment, espe-
cially when other penal changes are considered, was generally in-
creased. As a result, some idealists have argued that the reform
process was subverted by crime control interests.' 8 7
D. INSTITUTIONAL INTERESTS
In sharp contrast with earlier reformers, those promoting de-
terminate sentencing recognized the shortcomings of penal institu-
tions. Indeed, the failures of parole boards, and to a lesser extent,
sentencing judges, prompted the reform effort. Reformers argued
that because such decisionmakers could not be trusted on faith, de-
cisions had to be regulated. Yet, in some respects, determinate sen-
tencing simply shifted the institutional balance of power.
Legislators gained power by eliminating the administrative authority
of parole boards and restricting the sentencing powers of judges
through either direct enactment or delegation to a sentencing com-
mission. By design or by default, legislators also increased the pow-
ers of prosecutors.
The alteration of institutional powers was controversial and
widely debated. Many reformers argued that giving more sentenc-
ing power to legislatures was unwise, given politicians' propensity
for taking a short-term, partisan approach to penal issues.' 8 Less
widely debated was the effect of new determinate schemes upon
prosecutors.' 89 For the most part, reform schemes have not sought
to restrict significantly prosecutors' discretion over sentencing
through the bringing of charges or plea bargaining. ' 90 To an extent
187 See, e.g., Greenberg & Humphries, The Cooption of Fixed Sentencing Reform, 26 CRIME
& DELINQ. 206 (1980).
188 See, e.g., von Hirsch, supra note 171, at 167-68. Of course, jurisdictions without
determinate sentencing schemes remain prone to similar problems through the passage
of mandatory minimum penalties.
189 See, e.g., Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and Prosecutorial Power: A Critique of Recent Pro-
posalsfor 'Fixed' and 'Presumptive' Sentencing, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 550, 564 (1978) (arguing
that reformers have generally ignored prosecutorial sentencing power); Schulhofer, Due
Process of Sentencing, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 733, 741 (1980) (arguing that all recent sentenc-
ing commission proposals have failed to address prosecutorial discretion).
190 On Minnesota's scheme, see Falvey, Defense Perspectives on the Minnesota Sentencing
Guidelines, 5 HAMLINE L. REV. 257, 258-59 (1982); Rathke, Plea Negotiating Under the Sen-
tencing Guidelines, 5 HAMLINE L. REV. 271 (1982). See also, Ku, supra note 159, at 127. In
federal reform, Congress indicated a desire to curb prosecutorial discretion in plea bar-
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not presently clear, negotiations between defense attorneys and
prosecutors have led to case dispositions different from what deter-
minate standards would have dictated.
19'
Perhaps the most important institutional consideration, the im-
pact of penal change on prison populations, was discussed but
rarely addressed with any seriousness. One of the long-term trends
of punishment in the 1970s was a significant increase in the length
of time convicts spent in prison.1 92 Due in part to determinate sen-
tencing reforms and in part to altered priorities by both judges and
parole boards, prison populations increased during the late seven-
ties, even while the total number of persons admitted to prisons de-
creased. 193  In 1974, a total of 218,500 adult felons were
incarcerated; by 1979, that number had swelled to 301,800.1 94
From 1980 through 1984, the nation's prison population grew
by forty-one percent, with more than half a million residing in
prison by the end of 1985.195 The number of federal prisoners has
increased from about 19,000 in 1980196 to over 48,000 in 1988.197
Recent federal drug penalty legislation and other changes are ex-
pected to increase the federal prison population to somewhere be-
tween 105,000 and 156,000 by 2002.198 In California, in the first six
years of the eighties, the state's prison population increased by an
average of 16% per year, climbing from some 23,000 inmates in
1980 to nearly 58,000 in 1986.199
Although jurisdictions throughout the nation built new prisons,
gaining. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 177, at 167. The new guidelines give judges signifi-
cant power to accept or reject plea bargains, but in this respect they do not represent a
significant change in federal law. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 177, at § 6B1.2 and
commentary. The Commission regards substantive restrictions on judicial discretion
over plea bargaining as premature. See Alschuler, Departures and Plea Agreements Under the
Sentencing Guidelines, 117 F.R.D. 459, 461 (1988); Breyer, supra note 186, at 29-31.
191 SeeJ. Casper, et al. supra note 168, at 32-44 (empirical study of three California
counties suggests no major difference in pattern of plea bargaining with introduction of
determinate sentencing); Knapp, Impact of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines on Sentencing
Practices, 5 HAMLINE L. REV. 237, 255-56 (1982) (suggesting a pattern of negotiated dis-
positions which varies from what guidelines would have required).
192 See Greenberg & Humphries, supra note 187, at 220-221.
193 UNIFORM PAROLE REPORTS, PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATES: 1979 17-21 (1979).
194 Id. at 18. The most rapid growth occurred from 1975 to 1977.
195 REPORT TO THE NATION, supra note 148, at 105.
196 DEPARTMENT OFJUSTICE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS ON PRISONERS IN STATE AND FED-
ERAL INSTITUTIONS, YEAREND, 1925-86 13 (1988) [hereinafter HISTORICAL STATISTICS].
197 N.Y.Times, April 25, 1988, at 1, col. 4.
198 UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON THE INITIAL
SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS 71, 73 (1987), reprinted in PRACTISING
LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 313, 389-91 (1987) [hereinafter SUP-
PLEMENTARY REPORT].
199 HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 196, at 13. Prison population in the state from
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increases in bed space lagged far behind the increase in inmate
populations.200 The result was that more prisoners were crammed
into less space. With courts playing a more aggressive role in super-
vising prison conditions, however, there were limits to this alterna-
tive. 201 In many jurisdictions, legislatures provided for a tacit return
to parole. Connecticut, for example, which had eliminated all forms
of parole, restored discretionary parole in 1982, in response to a
rapidly growing prison population. 20 2 Illinois used liberal grants of
what it called "meritorious good time" to clear its prisons for new
prisoners. 20 3 In 1982, California increased the amount of good time
a prisoner might earn to fifty percent of his or her sentence, thus
cutting down the length of prison terms and easing overcrowd-
ing.20 4 In many jurisdictions, the task was left entirely to correc-
tional authorities who responded in a variety of ways, such as
holding state prisoners in local jails, increasing use of work release
and community treatment programs, and instituting varieties of in-
stitutional parole.
205
The shift in mode of punishment, from indeterminate sentenc-
ing to determinate, was not a major cause of prison overcrowding.
Most determinate sentences were set based on the average length of
time served under indeterminate sentencing.20 6 Instead, a general
trend toward harsher punishment and an increase in crime were the
main factors leading to overcrowding.20 7 Determinate sentencing
1977-85 increased significantly faster than the state's population. CALIFORNIA PRISON-
ERS AND CIVIL NARCOTIC ADDICTS, 1983, 1984 & 1985 1 (1986).
200 See, e.g., GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON PRISON OVERCROWDING, JAIL AND PRISON
OVERCROWDING: AN INTERIM REPORT (1981); RESEARCH ON SENTENCING, supra note 159,
at 32-33.
201 By 1987, some 36 state prison systems were operating under a court order or
consent decree of some kind, most involving population controls. McCarthy, Responding
to the Prison Crowding Crisis: The Restructuring of a Prison System, 2 CRIM. JUST. POL'Y REV. 3
(1989), citing 1987 ACLU National Prison Project.
202 L. GOODSTEIN &J. HEPBURN, supra note 159, at 94-95.
203 Id. at 109-10.
204 CAL. PENAL CODE § 2931 (West 1989), amended by Stats. 1982 c. 1234 § 2. For
measures taken by other states to reduce prison crowding, see DEPARTMENT OFJUSTICE,
CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1985 48 (1987); REPORT TO THE NA-
TION, supra note 148, at 109.
205 See, e.g., McCarthy, supra note 201, at 14-17 (reviewing the response of the Ala-
bama correctional system to prison overcrowding).
206 See Breyer, supra note 186, at 7 (noting few departures in guidelines from prior
practice); Messinger &Johnson, supra note 159, at 53 (noting the irony of initial Califor-
nia determinate sentence lengths being based on average terms served under discretion-
ary sentencing); see also, Ku, supra note 159, at 71-72 (noting that determinate sentencing
in California neither increased nor decreased average prision time).
207 See L. GOODSTEIN &J. HEPBURN, supra note 159, at 85; RESEARCH ON SENTENCING,
supra note 159, at 32-33. On the forecasted impact of federal guidelines on prison popu-
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reforms, particularly the end of discretionary parole, eliminated
traditional means for easing population pressures, however, and
made the effects of overcrowding more severe. Public demand en-
couraged politicians, prosecutors and judges to send more criminals
to prison without regard to institutional capacities. The elimination
of the parole safety valve created the potential for systemic
breakdown.
Only one jurisdiction, Minnesota, made institutional resources
a prime consideration in punishment. The state created a sentenc-
ing commission to promulgate sentencing guidelines, subject to the
stricture that the prison population remain within the capacity of the
prison system. 20 8 Most otherjurisdictions were satisfied with vague
imprecations about avoiding overcrowding. 20 9
Within the prison, the dominant realities of the eighties were
overcrowded conditions, meaning less privacy, less recreation, less
work, and more violence. Prison crowding generally leads to in-
creased assaults, suicides, physical and mental disorders, discipli-
nary infractions, and violent deaths.210 In addition, prisons housed
more prisoners serving long terms. 211 The improvements in pris-
oner attitudes and correctional management, which some had
hoped might result from an increase in determinacy in release deci-
sions, did not materialize. 212
lations, see Block & Rhodes, Forecasting the Impact of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 7
BEHAV. Sci. & L. 51 (1989); SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 198, at 53-75.
208 S. SHANE-DuBow, supra note 157, at 159, 166.
209 For example, in the federal system, Congress mandated that the Sentencing Com-
mission formulate its guidelines "to minimize the likelihood that the Federal prison pop-
ulation will exceed the capacity of the Federal prisons .... ." 28 U.S.C. 994(g).
Mandatory penalties and other directions given the Commission seem to have out-
weighed this imprecation, however. See Breyer, supra note 186, at 4, 23-25 (explaining
that the Sentencing Commission avoided major departures from past sentencing prac-
tices to minimize prison crowding, but noting that there is no national consensus on
whether sentencers should be limited by present prison capacity); Weinstein, A Trial
Judge's First Impression of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 52 ALB. L. REV. 1, 19 (1987)(argu-
ing that the Sentencing Commission failed to address the dangers of overcrowding); see
also von Hirsch, supra note 171, at 176-79 (contrasting Minnesota's experience with that
of Pennsylvania, where political concerns that guidelines would not be tough enough
prevented any firm restraint on prison population); Hamm, supra note 154, at 121 (not-
ing lack of planning for increase in prison population in Indiana).
210 Jan, Overcrowding and Inmate Behavior: Some Preliminary Findings, 7 CRIM. JUST. &
BEHAV. 293, 298 (1980); G. MCCAIN, V. Cox & P. PAULUS, THE EFFECT OF PRISON
CROWDING ON INMATE BEHAVIOR 2-6, 117, 131 (1980).
211 See, e.g., Hamm, supra note 154, at 120 (noting an increase in the number of prison-
ers serving long terms in Indiana). Many jurisdictions have enacted much stiffer penal-
ties for a few serious offenses. See, e.g., Block & Rhodes, supra note 207, at 57-69
(forecasting the impact of new federal penalties for drug and career criminal offenses).
212 See L. GOODSTEIN &J. HEPBURN, supra note 159, at 163-64, 167-69. A recent study
suggests that a majority of inmates are now either undecided about or opposed to deter-
[Vol. 80768
UNDERSTANDING PENAL REFORM
IV. THE LIMITS AND POSSIBILITIES OF PENAL REFORM
The "lessons" of history are the stuff of which reform is made.
The first American penal reformers used history to label corporal
punishment primitive and brutal. Modem reformers teach that in-
determinate sentencing led to injustice by punishing similar offenses
in disparate ways. History, viewed in this fashion, is a storybook,
with contemporary ideology providing the morals. The insistently
cyclical nature of penal reform, however, should provide a caution
for reading the past so simply. With each major change in the na-
tion's penal methods being promoted as the cure for its predeces-
sor, and each reform producing new excesses requiring further
reform, with the same set of rival justifications of punishment com-
peting for dominance in a seemingly endless game of philosophical
musical chairs, the need for a broader perspective on penal change
should be apparent.
The final portion of this Article examines recent sentencing re-
forms in light of earlier reforms and develops some of the policy
implications of the tripartite structure of penal change. After a brief
overview of the successes and failures of determinate sentencing,
attention turns to one of the basic questions presented by the Arti-
cle's analysis: From an idealist perspective, is real reform possible?
The model of reform suggests basic reasons why reforms rarely turn
out as intended and raises the possibility that justice-inspired re-
forms do more harm than good. I argue that the risks of inaction
and the possibility of reaching a principled compromise between
competing penal influences make reform a necessary part of the
ongoing effort to do justice in criminal cases. The tripartite model
suggests that reformers take a strategic approach to penal change,
concentrating not only upon the ideal, but also upon the best means
to achieve that ideal, given the influence of rival ideologies and in-
terests. In other words, success in penal reform should be seen as
the best and most lasting compromise between penal interests in-
stead of the illusory triumph of a single interest. The Article con-
cludes with a brief look to the future of penal reform.
A. DETERMINATE SENTENCING IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A full evaluation of determinate sentencing reform involves a
number of difficulties. The schemes enacted vary enormously from
one jurisdiction to another. Recent changes range from selective
minate sentencing, a significant change from the days when it was first proposed. Lar-




enactment of minimum mandatory sentences to ambitious legisla-
tive schemes like California's to sentencing commission schemes
like that of the federal government. In many instances, the differ-
ences between schemes may prove more important and more illumi-
nating than the similarities. Defining the basic goal of these reforms
presents another difficulty because change is normally the product
of compromise between ideological opponents. Finally, any evalua-
tion must be tentative, as jurisdictions continue to consider and im-
plement determinate schemes. With these cautions in mind, we may
ask whether recent reformers succeeded any better in implementing
their view of punishment than their predecessors. How much re-
semblance does the present practice of punishment bear to the orig-
inal idealist vision of reform? Putting aside problems with the
theory of determinate sentencing,2 13 what are the obstacles to re-
form presented by the tripartite nature of penal change? The an-
swers suggested do not present any startling insights. Indeed, most
of the shortcomings of recent reform have been widely noted. The
significance of the evaluation lies in recognizing that many of the
failings of recent reforms stem from recurring situations in Ameri-
can punishment. The historical perspective may help us better un-
derstand the nature of these problems and take them more
seriously.
1. The Ideological Struggle
From the moral idealist viewpoint, the most positive aspect of
the determinate sentencing movement has been its recognition that
punishment is fundamentally an issue of criminal justice and should
center on the same issues of moral responsibility as does criminal
liability generally. The movement has brought punishment back
within the legal sphere. Even those reformers with a utilitarian ap-
proach have urged a modest and justice-based vision of punish-
ment.2 1 4 Given the moral failures of earlier, instrumental penal
213 The theoretical shortcomings of determinate sentencing are not considered in this
Article. A full theoretical evaluation would take up retribution as a theory of punish-
ment and the limits of law in defining justice. On this latter point, determinate sentenc-
ing presumes that determinate rules may produce, or at least significantly enhance the
production of, just results. At least three deeper assumptions lie beneath this concept:
1) that the basic principles ofjustice are themselves sufficiently determinate to be cap-
tured in rules; 2) that the complexities of criminal cases may, for purposes of punish-
ment, be reduced to a few basic criteria; and 3) that these rules will have determinate
meanings. Each of these assumptions raises basic philosophical difficulties.
214 See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 178, at 65, which states the following on federal
sentencing reform:
The shameful disparity in criminal sentences is a major flaw in the existing criminal
justice system, and makes it clear that the system is ripe for reform. Correcting our
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visions, the determinate sentencing movement has the great virtue
of placing immediate justice concerns above utopian dreams of a
crime-free society. The modesty and justice-orientation of recent
penal change can be exaggerated, however. Much related penal
change, such as the enactment of minimum mandatory penalties,
has been justified as a better means of combating crime. While such
change usually has not borne the label "reform," because it does
not involve significant innovation in the form or distribution of pun-
ishment, its impact may prove more important than any "reforms."
In terms of achieving the concrete goals of equality and propor-
tionality in punishment, idealist success has been limited by the ex-
tent of political consensus. Where idealists and crime control
advocates have joined together to eliminate sentence disparity, they
have taken measures which advance that goal. On the question of
sentence proportionality, which involves determinations of proper
sentence length, idealists and their crime control opponents have
found less room for agreement. The two groups have disagreed
about the relative severity of different offenses and about the basic
scale of penal severity. Moral idealists hoped to limit punishment
through determinate methods, but can claim no great successes in
this effort. In many instances, crime control advocates have won an
expansion in the use of punishment. 215 In the ideological conflict
over sentence length, crime control forces have won most recent
battles. 21
6
The pattern of recent ideological combat recalls that of earlier
reforms. The penitentiary, hailed in the post-Revolution years as
the symbol of republican benevolence, was, by the Jacksonian era,
more representative of a state campaign to repress disorderly ele-
ments in society. The correctional reforms which followed in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were promoted as
kindly treatment. They won acceptance and were utilized as addi-
tional, punitive sanctions against criminal offenders.
The greatest historical distinction presented by recent penal
change is the extent to which the conflict between the idealistic and
ordering aims of punishment has become an explicit part of the pe-
nal debate.2 17 Recent reformers have understood the need for a re-
arbitrary and capricious method of sentencing will not be a panacea for all of the
problems which confront the administration of criminal justice, but it will constitute
a significant step forward.
215 See, e.g., Greenberg & Humphries, supra note 187; Schwerk, supra note 172.
216 Recent federal reforms provide the best example. See supra notes 176-85 and ac-
companying text.
217 This may be an historical illusion, however, caused by the fact that most histories
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form strategy that would account for ideological opposition.
Idealists have acknowledged and attempted to address the concerns
and the political influence of crime control proponents. For exam-
ple, idealists have urged the use of sentencing commissions as a
means of insulating the sentence-length debate from partisan poli-
tics. 218 Of course, such commissions remain part of the political
structure, subject to legislative decisionmaking. 219
2. Institutions and Ideology
In any review of determinate sentencing, institutional problems
loom large for both the idealist and the crime control adherent.
Overcrowding has proven and will continue to prove a major obsta-
cle to determinacy. Burgeoning prison populations have forced
public officials to implement a wide variety of early release pro-
grams. Given the cost of prison construction and maintenance and
the relative dearth of public resources in contemporary America,
overcrowding appears likely to grow far worse. Despite some im-
pressive public expenditures on its behalf, the American penal sys-
tem has always worked within fiscal restraints which severely limit
the opportunity for fundamental penal change. 2
20
Overcrowding presents particular problems for the ideology of
rights idealist, because it alters the basic nature of punishment with-
out regard to offender culpability. It makes the deprivations of lib-
erty, privacy, work, and security associated with incarceration more
severe, but not for reasons related to the prisoner's crime. The of-
fender receives a harsher sentence because the public does not want
to pay for more prison space. Overcrowding presents a significant
threat to crime control goals as well. With court-set limits on prison
populations and limited resources for new prisons, early release be-
comes the only viable alternative. The penal system still makes
worse threats than it can deliver in many instances.
Overcrowding, of course, has been part of American punish-
ment since the nation turned to incarceration as its primary criminal
penalty. Philadelphia's Walnut Street Jail, often called the "cradle
of the penitentiary" because it was the first American institution to
of penal reform have been written from the idealist perspective and give scant attention
to the forces opposing reform enactment.
218 See supra note 179.
219 Thus, although the federal sentencing commission has not, overall, sought to sig-
nificantly increase federal sentences, its guidelines in combination with new penal legis-
lation will have that effect. See Section lIC.
220 See Foote, Deceptive Determinate Sentencing in DETERMINATE SENTENCING: REFORM OR
REGRESSION?, supra note 159, at 137-140.
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make special provision for sentenced offenders, was overcrowded
within a decade of its renovation. The press of prisoners defeated
the reformative scheme of the jail and forced the resignation of re-
former-warden Caleb Lownes. 221 Two hundred years later, over-
crowding has the same corrosive effect upon criminal justice.
A second institutional concern with determinate sentencing,
implicating both idealist and crime control goals, is the failure to
control prosecutorial discretion. While schemes have restricted or
eliminated discretion by parole authorities, and many have re-
stricted discretion by judges, prosecutorial discretion has been
largely ignored. As a result, prosecutors have the power to change
the nature of determinate sentencing either for ideological pur-
poses, or, more likely, to enhance institutional efficiency. The po-
tential for institutional cooption is significant.
Although the analogy is by no means direct, one might recall
the early penitentiary, whose beneficence depended largely upon
the character of its warden. Early American reformers saw prison
wardens as exemplary figures-firm but fair, kind, just, and in-
sightful. In fact, they were expected to be virtually saints. 222 Yet,
most wardens were not saints, and their institutional role required
that they emphasize efficiency over reformation. The model warden
was not a celebrated cleric or humanitarian, but Captain Lynds,
master disciplinarian. His methods may not have reformed, but
they kept prisoners orderly at minimal cost. Similarly, a major
theme of the story of virtually all of the correctional innovations of
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was their cooption
by crime control and especially institutional interests. Placing un-
checked discretion in the hands of any single institutional player in-
vites distortion of idealistic aims.
The emphasis of recent penal schemes upon incarceration as
retaliation for crime presents other dangers of institutional abuse.
The legitimation and even celebration of punishment as punish-
ment 223 may encourage the native cruelties of the prison as an insti-
221 B. McKELvEY, supra note 6, at 9.
222 See, for example, Thomas Eddy's partial description of the ideal warden:
"A keeper should be a person of sound understanding, quick discernment, and
ready apprehension; of a temper cool, equable and dispassionate; with a heart
warmed with the feelings of benevolence, but firm and resolute; of manners digni-
fied and commanding, yet mild and conciliating; a lover of temperance, decency and
order; neither resentful, talkative, nor familiar; but patient, persevering and discrete
in all his conduct."
Quoted in O.F. LEwis, supra note 6, at 49 (quoting Thomas Eddy); see also E.C. WINES & T.
DwIGHT, supra note 52, at 120-23.
223 That is, as the infliction of suffering rather than rehabilitative treatment.
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tution. Without an institutional commitment to caring about
prisoners, the temptations to brutality and neglect inherent in the
prison world are likely to grow. Brutality and neglect have been
common enough in institutions explicitly dedicated to the improve-
ment of the inmate.
B. MORAL IDEALISM AND REFORM-A REJECTION OF THE TRAGIC
VIEW
The always quotable George Bernard Shaw warned us against
penal reform more than half a century ago. He urged the following
upon persons interested in taking up prison reform for benevolent
purposes:
[T]o put it down and go about some other business. It is just such
reformers who have in the past made the neglect, oppression, corrup-
tion, and physical torture of the common gaol the pretext for trans-
forming it into that diabolical den of torment, mischief, and
damnation, the modern prison.2
24
Shaw expressed a tragic view of idealistic reform-that it is an en-
deavor doomed to moral failure and should be avoided at all costs.
Some idealists may draw the same message from the tripartite
model of reform. The examples of reform reviewed here suggest
that idealistic penal reforms win "adoption" only when they also
promise enhancement of the state's powers to repress disorder.
Usually, this means an expansion of state powers, often to the detri-
ment ofjustice interests. The examples further suggest that, regard-
less of whether new penal methods reflect idealistic or ordering
priorities, the last word on penal practice rests with institutional
players who care most about institutional efficiency. Thus, the pros-
pects for real idealistic reform appear limited at best. Worse, the
idealist must acknowledge that his promotion of reform may give
rival interests the chance to make punishment even more unjust.
The tragic view of reform may be challenged on at least two
grounds, however. First, the tragic view assumes that the risks of
action outweigh the negative effects of inaction. Yet the costs of in-
action may be significant. Every instance of reform considered here
was motivated in part by a perception that the practice of punish-
ment had deteriorated to an unacceptable state during a period of
post-reform neglect. In the late eighteenth century, contemporaries
recognized the barbarity and inefficacy of corporal punishment.
The failures of the original conception of incarceration were equally
apparent to late nineteenth and early twentieth century reformers.
224 G.B. SHAW, THE CRIME OF IMPRISONMENT 13 (1922).
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By the late twentieth century, the arbitrary and unfair results of dis-
cretionary decisionmaking led to demands for change. As these ex-
amples demonstrate, if no one seeks ideological reform,
institutional interests will predominate. In this circumstance, pun-
ishment will address neither of its primary purposes but will become
the captive of an entirely self-interested bureaucracy.
The justice risks appear even greater when one considers the
easy confluence between the ordering impulse and institutional in-
terest. Modem punishment gives penal officials the power and
sanction forcibly to deprive wrongdoers of liberty because of their
wrongdoing. Both the punitive nature of the enterprise and the im-
balance of power inherent in the relationship between state and
prisoner represent temptations to cruelty. Whether these tempta-
tions are the cruelties of sadism or of indifference, they are not con-
cers addressed by the need for order or institutional interests.
Cruel methods may enhance public order and institutional stability.
Without a periodic renewal of the moral basis of punishment, its
practice will be characterized by offender mistreatment. 225 In other
words, even taking a dark view of reform, idealistic reform may be
necessary to improve punishment from the horrendous to the
merely bad.
Second, the tragic view assumes that principled compromise
between moral idealism and its main rivals in penal influence is im-
possible. The real question is whether the confluence or compro-
mise between penal forces which defines the nature of change can
be a principled one. Can reformers develop a meaningful strategy
for reform that takes account of rival influences? 226 When the con-
flict is a matter of ideology, as when liberals and conservatives disa-
gree on the appropriate sentence for a particular crime, principled
compromise will be difficult. Where ideologies directly conflict,
neither side is likely to grant the other more than it can demand
politically. Yet, punishment is a complex issue which allows for a
variety of solutions. The process of change adoption, which in-
volves the construction of a broad political consensus, provides one
example of ideological compromise.
Perhaps more promising is the prospect of an accord between
225 That is, by treatment which causes more suffering than is justified or authorized as
punishment.
226 Another way of putting this is to ask whether the entire process of reform can be
seen as essentially intentional-reflective of the conscious intention of an individual or
group-or whether its explanation is inevitably causal-the product of different groups
who act upon each other in unanticipated and unpredictable ways. See J. ELSTER, Ex-
PLAINING TECHNICAL CHANGE 32-48, 69-88 (1983).
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ideological and institutional visions of punishment. Here, the main
obstacle to successful compromise is the failure to recognize con-
flicting interests. Normally, the political dynamics of reform rele-
gate institutional interests to a quiet but subversive role. Not taken
seriously in the open debate about punishment, institutions never-
theless have the last word on reform. The challenge is to accord
political weight to the real influence of institutions.
C. A STRATEGIC APPROACH TO REFORM-TOWARD PRINCIPLED
COMPROMISE
The tripartite model of reform dictates that we redefine success
in the field of penal change. Regardless of personal views of what
punishment should be, we must accept and respect the pluralistic
nature of punishment. For the moral idealist (and every other inter-
ested party), this means concentrating upon the optimal, as opposed
to the maximal, solution. It means recognizing the inevitability and
incorrigibility of ideological and institutional conflict over the prac-
tice of punishment. It means developing a strategy for reaching a
principled compromise that will, over the long run, best promote
the penal ideal.
Idealists must recognize that no penal system, however just, will
survive long if it is too expensive, too inefficient, or appears too soft
on criminals. The early promoters of the penitentiary demonstrated
a faith in its "benevolence" that failed to recognize the demands of
a public threatened by criminal and other threats to order. Even
after more than a century of penal experience, reformers early in
this century confidently predicted that "punishment"-harsh treat-
ment in retribution for wrongdoing-would soon disappear.2 27 In
both instances, reformers not only overestimated the efficacy of re-
formative methods, they ignored political reality. However, much
punishment is a matter ofjustice and a reflection of society's morals,
it is also the primary means of keeping the domestic peace. It is,
and always will be, a powerful symbol of society's ability to maintain
civic order. In this respect, contemporary reformers have displayed
greater political awareness, perhaps because the crime control phi-
losophy was, almost from the beginning of the movement, impor-
tant in reform adoption.2 28
Reformers have usually ignored, or minimized, the limitations
of penal institutions. In creating the first penitentiaries, legislatures
227 See, e.g., E. SUTHERLAND, CRIMINOLOGY 360 (1924).
228 See, e.g., Messinger, Introduction A. VON HIRSCH & K. HANRAHAN, supra note 134, at
xxx (noting that crime control will always be a motive for sentencing reform).
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in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries often gave ex-
plicit directions for penal management. 229 The failure to provide
sufficient resources often rendered such directions moot, how-
ever.230 In both the creation of the penitentiary and the correc-
tional system, reform also suffered from a misunderstanding of
institutional dynamics. Reformers did not recognize the nonideo-
logical, efficiency bias of those in charge of punishment. In recent
years, while reformers have shown more institutional awareness,
politicians have not. Policy makers have generally ignored warnings
of prison overcrowding and uncontrolled prosecutorial discretion.
By now, however, the institutional message should be clear: if we
ask our institutions to do the impossible, they will not only fail, they
will probably do something quite different than envisioned.
Any compromise between rival forces must extend over time in
order to succeed. The examples of reform reviewed here suggest
that the cycle of penal change follows the waxing and waning of dif-
ferent interests. Each ideology or interest seeks to put its perma-
nent stamp upon punishment at its time of maximum influence.
Reformers cannot alter this political dynamic, but can seek to mod-
erate it. For example, many idealist advocates of sentencing reform
have argued for reliance upon sentencing commissions as institu-
tions which may take a longer view of penal issues and more consci-
entiously seek a lasting (and principled) compromise between all
penal interests. Thus, the sentencing commission might, over the
lifetime of determinate sentencing, better protect idealist values.
The strategy of seeking principled compromise is, of course,
easier stated than accomplished. In many instances, it may prove
impossible. What is important in future endeavors, and what is
most encouraging about recent efforts, is that reformers recognize
the importance of strategic action. If every interested party acts
without regard to the interest or influence of others, then change
will be only a haphazard reflection of what is intended. If interested
parties acknowledge and respect each others' views and power, then
they may reach a negotiated accomodation. In this way, change may
be planned; it will not just "happen."
Acknowledging the pluralist nature of change will not, by itself,
transform American punishment, however. We still have to decide
what we want from criminal punishment. This Article has studied
229 See, e.g., T. DUMM, supra note 18, at 104-05 (reviewing Pennsylvania legislation of
1790 which detailed the extent of isolation, conditions of labor, diet, hygiene, and
amount of rest to be afforded prisoners in Philadelphia's Walnut Street Jail).
230 See id. at 105.
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reform from a largely instrumental perspective. It has not taken up
the vital moral issue of whether reformers' aims were appropriate or
correct, nor has it directly explored the relationship between the
state of American society, crime, and punishment. In any debate
about punishment, these issues must be resolved first. The model
of reform may assist in developing new reform strategies but it does
not help decide what our goals should be.
D. LOOKING AHEAD
Looking to the past of penal reform gives some, albeit limited,
insight into what may come. One relatively safe prediction is that
the near future will bring significant penal change. Even if the na-
tion experiences no further debates about the nature or purpose of
punishment, institutional forces, particularly prison overcrowding,
will force new ways of punishing criminal offenders. By failing to
address prison overcrowding, states and the federal government
have created a situation where institutional pressures will, at some
point, become overwhelming. 231 When this happens, however, our
options for dealing with the problem will be severely limited. Most
solutions to overcrowding require long-range planning. Those who
will have to take action, primarily courts and state officials, will have
to do so in the absence of planning or any developed public consen-
sus. Such officials will probably lack the power to alleviate over-
crowding in ways consistent with the goals of criminal punishment.
Unless jurisdictions start to view prison overcrowding as an oppor-
tunity for further penal reform, change will be haphazard at best.
The biggest question mark for the future is the next direction in
moral idealism. As we have seen, penal reform generally begins
with a new vision of ideal punishment drawn from a new way of
looking at public policy issues. The republican and humanitarian
philosophies of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries,
the scientific revolution of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, and the ideology of rights of the later twentieth century
all inspired distinctive approaches to punishment. Perhaps the con-
servative political ideology from which crime control proponents
have drawn represents the next dominant public policy ideology. If
so, history may judge the present trend toward penal expansion as
the beginning of a new reform era, rather than part of the determi-
231 Interestingly, this is the opposite of the compromise involved in the earlier correc-
tional system reforms. There, by failing to take account of institutional pressures, but
allowing them free reign, the reforms were long-lived, but subject to institutional coop-
tion. With determinate sentencing, there are few safety valves for institutional pressures
and formal change will likely be required.
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nate sentencing movement. If not, if this trend simply reflects a re-
assertion of the need for order,232 then the future of idealism
remains murky. Not only is there no indication of another idealistic
approach to punishment, there is no indication of a change in basic
public policy vision from which penal reform may grow. We may be
entering an era when penal institutions will direct penal change. As
the historical record demonstrates, such institutional predominance
bodes poorly for either justice concerns or punishment as crime
suppression.
V. CONCLUSION
We almost certainly cannot end the cycle of abuse and reform
which has characterized the history of American punishment. The
dynamic of penal change is too complex and too fluid for that. Cer-
tain forces will predominate at certain times and democratic bodies,
responsive to shifts in public mood, will not often take the long
view. Moral idealists today may complain long and hard about ex-
cessive severity in punishment, but with crime control advocates in
the ascendancy, the idealists will not be heard. At least they will not
be heard until the next stage in the process of penal change, when
circumstances will make moral idealism, perhaps of a new variety,
politically attractive again. This may occur when the prison system
begins to collapse under the weight of its burgeoning population.
If the cycle of abuse-reform cannot be ended, it can be moder-
ated. If all who are engaged in penal issues recognize the impor-
tance of rival interests-even those not in the political ascendancy at
the moment-then perhaps compromises can be reached which will
smooth the transitions between the different stages of change. If
moral idealists acknowledge the political potency of society's need
for order in penal issues, if all who are concerned with policy take
seriously the limitations of institutions, then the gap between penal
ideal and reality may be narrowed. The political and institutional
awareness shown by many determinate sentencing reformers repre-
sents a modest, though significant improvement along these lines.
In the enactment of determinate reforms, however, the failure of
political consensus and the failure to account for institutional conse-
quences mean that further reforms will soon be required.
232 I suspect this is the case for several reasons. Both as a matter of general public
policy and as a matter of penal philosophy, I see the conservative trend as more a correc-
tive to the liberal ideology of rights than a new creative force. In the penal field, the
conservative crime control philosophy addresses the need for order more than it ad-
dresses justice concerns. Of course, this may be just wishful thinking on the part of one
who sides more often with liberals than conservatives in penal debates.
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One thing is clear. After two hundred years of experience with
penal reform, we can no longer claim that we do not know any
better.
